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This article concerns a subject about which a great deal has been said,
and over which many people have drawn battle lines.1 I believe, however,
that I offer a different view. I myself believe that natural selection explains
the origin of species. I think it is improbable that theories of irreducible
complexity and intelligent design, which I shall explain and discuss here,2
provide answers. I also believe, however, that the introduction of these
alternate theories in public school biology classes would accomplish
desirable purposes-and that it could be accomplished consistently with the
Constitution.3
I. INTRODUCTION: THE BACTERIAL FLAGELLUM
AND Two VIEWS OF ITS ORIGINS
There is a wonderful puzzle presented by the bacterial flagellum, that
wavy appendage that supplies locomotion for some microorganisms.
4
Originally, scientists thought that bacteria moved by whipping their flagella
back and forth.5 In fact, flagellum derives from the Latin word for "whip."6
More recent observations, however, show that the flagellum for some
organisms is a corkscrew, and it does not sway back and forth. Instead, it
turns on a wheel that is embedded in the microorganism. 7 If one pictures a
1. For an introduction to the controversy and the respective positions, see, e.g., LESLIE C.
GRIFFIN, LAW AND RELIGION: CASES AND MATERIALS 563-618 (2006). For a treatment that
explores the subject in a scholarly way but concludes, as this article does, that teaching irreducible
complexity and intelligent design in public schools could be accomplished constitutionally, see
Johnny Rex Buckles, The Constitutionality of the Monkey Wrench: Exploring the Case for
Intelligent Design, 59 OKLA. L. REv. 527 (2006).
2. See infra notes 23-46 and accompanying text.
3. See infra Parts II-V; see also Buckles, supra note 1 (expressing a similar conclusion, but
with exploration of different issues).
4. See Wikipedia, Flagellum, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flagellum (last visited Sept. 28,
2008).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., id.; Access Research Network Molecular Machines Museum, The Bacterial
Flagellum, http://www.am.org/docs/mm/flagellumall.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2008) (describing
the views of Michael Behe, including support for theories of irreducible complexity); Ian Musgrave,
Evolution of the Bacterial Flagella, (Mar. 17, 2000), http://www.health.adelaide.edu.au/
Pharm/Musgrave/essays/flagella.htm (providing a theory, instead, of evolution). As Musgrave
points out, "there is no 'the' bacterial flagella." Id. Flagella of eubacteria and archebacteria are
superficially similar, but in fact they are composed of different, non-homologous proteins. Id. The
difference suggests that the two systems probably evolved independently, through distinct pathways,
after the eubacterial/archebacterial evolutionary split. Id. Even within eubacteria, there are distinct
forms. Id. The variation in types of flagella is not determinative in most aspects of this article,
however, and it refers to "the" flagellum as including flagella generally except when distinctions
bear, a horse, or a whale with locomotion supplied by wheels buried in its
torso, one can imagine the surprise that bacteriologists must have felt when
they learned how the flagellum works.
But actually, the mechanism of the flagellum is even stranger and more
complex than this. The bacterium needs something to turn the wheel to
which its corkscrew is appended. And it has a connection to make it turn,
because the wheel is serrated, and it fits another wheel in a gear-like
system.8  The mechanism needs lubrication, as well as a system for
removing impurities, and the bacterium is equipped with both.9 The
flagellum needs a propeller, and it has one: the corkscrew.10 The driving
wheel needs a source of circular motion, and it is there: a motor that uses
hydrogen ion flow across a living gradient. I" The bacterium also can boast
dozens or even hundreds of other coordinated parts, such as bearings,
bushings, and universal joints. 2
The reason that the flagellum is a puzzle is that our prevailing theory of
the origin of species involves natural selection. This phenomenon is the
mechanism for a theory sometimes referred to as evolution, 3 but this label
should not be taken too literally because "evolution" seems to suggest
steady, smooth, and purposeful change. Natural selection is not necessarily
steady, smooth, or purposeful. 14 The essence of the theory can be expressed
in a single sentence: random genetic mutations in discrete characteristics
produce individuals that propagate at different rates, and those that survive
and propagate most plentifully in the existing environment are "naturally
selected."15  Thus, species change is accomplished by small, sudden, and
among types are necessary. Id.
8. Musgrave, supra note 7, at 2-4.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. Flagella and their drives are machines of "staggering complexity, with dozens or even
hundreds of precisely tailored parts." Access Research Network Molecular Machines Museum,
supra note 7.
13. See Wikipedia, Evolution, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolution (last visited Sept. 28,
2008). The subject is explored in many different high school and college texts. See, e.g., GEORGE
JOHNSON & PETER RAVEN, BIOLOGY ch. 13 (2004); WILLIAM K. PURVES ET AL., LIFE: THE SCIENCE
OF BIOLOGY chs. 1, 21-22 (6th ed. 2001); PETER H. RAVEN & GEORGE B. JOHNSON, BIOLOGY ch. 1
(2d ed. 1989).
14. There are different kinds of evolution, corresponding to different mechanisms. See
Wikipedia, Evolution, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolution (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
"Directional" selection is the shift in average traits over generations: for example, organisms slowly
growing taller. Id. But "disruptive" selection results from change in biota such that extreme traits
provide a new survival or procreative advantage, and it produces more sudden change. Id. There
also is a type of "stabilizing" selection, which tends toward uniformity. Id.
15. See id. More precisely, variations occur from three mechanisms: natural selection, genetic
drift (the alteration in allele frequency in progeny caused by random sampling of genes), and gene
flow (the transfer of genes within and between different populations). Id. The latter two
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non-purposeful steps. Most mutations are dysfunctional and lead to
premature death.16 It is only the occasional, rare difference that improves
survival and enhances propagation enough to become a lasting adaptation. 7
Therefore, the process occurs in tiny increments, over enormous numbers of
individuals.
The problem posed by the bacterial flagellum is that it takes real
imagination to see how the entire mechanism could have resulted from a
process of natural selection. 8 Darwin himself observed that his theory
would fail if contradicted by the identification of complex systems that were
incapable of being created through discrete steps.' 9 At first blush, the
bacterial flagellum might seem to embody exactly the falsifying instance
that Darwin was talking about. Its interlocked parts might seem too diverse,
too complex, and too coordinated to have resulted from a sequence of
random changes. Furthermore, it is not easy to postulate a means by which
these tightly fitting elements could have sprung into existence
independently.2 ° It might seem that the wheel would be useless without its
serrations. Or without the driving gear. Or without the flagellum, or
without its corkscrew propeller, or without the lubricating and self-cleaning
systems that support them.21 Thus, the notion that the entire set of parts
appeared coincidentally but simultaneously from a large number of random
mutations all occurring at once seems improbable, and the idea that the parts
mechanisms are related to Mendelian heredity-the genetic influence of a parent upon the genes of
offspring-which, during the 1930s, combined with the theories of Charles Darwin to produce the
modem evolutionary synthesis. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See generally MICHAEL J. BEHE, DARWIN'S BLACK Box: THE BIOCHEMICAL CHALLENGE TO
EVOLUTION 72-73 (1996) (using the flagellum as an example in support of the irreducible
complexity theory). "Darwinian theory has given no explanation for the cilium or flagellum. The
overwhelming complexity of the swimming systems push us to think it may never give an
explanation." Id. at 73. In arguable contradiction of this statement, however, Darwinian theory has
proposed possible answers. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see infra note 29 and
accompanying text.
19. See CHARLES R. DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION, OR
THE PRESERVATION OF FAVOURED RACES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE 158-60 (Bantam Books 1999)
(1859).
20. It is not easy a priori, perhaps, but it is important to emphasize that it has been done, and
reasonably promptly after the challenge arose. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
21. Arguably, however, the key phrase here is, "It might seem." There is a flaw in reasoning
from this inference. An adaptation naturally selected because it provides an advantage through one
discrete function may undergo further mutation and thereby adapt to serve another function, and thus
it may evolve into a mechanism more complex than would be likely to result from a single
evolutionary step. This phenomenon is referred to as "exadaptation." See infra note 165 and
accompanying text. It provides a powerful counter-theory to models of irreducible complexity.
came into being sequentially and independently might seem almost as
improbable, because separately they could not accomplish what the
combined mechanism can do. The theory fails unless the separate parts,
when they appeared, could have enhanced the survival and reproduction of
the bacterium." Or at least, this reasoning describes how the problem might
appear upon first examination.
The less widely accepted concept of "irreducible complexity '23 is a
controversial alternative to natural selection, and its fundamental idea can be
stated with equal simplicity. Advocates of this model argue that some
systems in living organisms exhibit such irreducible complexity that they
cannot have been produced by the coincidence of multiple random
mutations. 24 They must instead be the product of purposeful processes, or in
other words, of intelligent design.25 Proponents of this argument illustrate it
by examples such as the bacterial flagellum. 26  Irreducible complexity
theorists claim that this multi-part mechanism contradicts the assumptions
underlying natural selection as an exclusive theory and requires the
additional inference of a purposeful element in the origin of species, at least
to explain some phenomena.27
Debates between proponents of irreducible complexity and adherents to
natural selection tend to end in indeterminacy. Irreducible complexity
advocates confront natural selectioners with examples such as the bacterial
flagellum, arguing that these phenomena are not easily explainable by
Darwin's theory.2 8 Bacteriologists have, in fact, responded to the irreducible
complexity criticism by proposing pathways by which natural selection of
the separate parts of the flagellum could have proceeded.29 But there is as
yet no consensus, and we are a long way from the kind of testing and proof
22. But see supra note 21 (debunking this reasoning).
23. The overall theory related to this idea is often described as "intelligent design," although this
label is more controversial. See Wikipedia, Intelligent Design, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Intelligent design (last visited September 28, 2008). "Irreducible complexity" is Michael Behe's
proposed evidence that evolution alone is an insufficient theory. See BEHE, supra note 18, at 72-73.
In this article, I use both "intelligent design" and "irreducible complexity" to refer to the same
groups of theories on the grounds that "irreducible complexity" is the less objectionable term, a term
that is closely identified with intelligent design, and arguably, if it is accepted, implies its viability.
See infra Part V.C.2.
24. See BEHE, supra note 18, at 72-73.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., Musgrave, supra note 7. Musgrave proposes "a possible scenario" for evolutionary
pathways, in which "a secretory system arose first.., which was the common ancestor of [a type of]
secretory system, and the flagellar system[,]" after which, a crude flagellum appeared as part of the
secretory structure, and finally, the motor evolved from "an ion pump which was doing something
else...." Id.
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that would enable natural selection advocates to claim that the puzzle is
solved.30  Thus, the answer of natural selectioners boils down to the
suggestion that, some day, advances in observation certainly will enable us
to explain these unknowns. 31  Among themselves, irreducible complexity
adherents might see the argument of some of their opponents that "your
theory is wrong, even if we can't explain the data yet ' 32 as ranking with the
arguments of Galileo's detractors, who used epicycles to explain planetary
retrogression.33 In any case, one might think that the criticisms implied by
irreducible complexity theory would be recognized as valuable.
But in this, one would be quite wrong. Instead, the enemies of
irreducible complexity have managed to drive it out of the public square.34
Their weapon, unfortunately, has not been the kind of debate that I have just
described. Instead, they have used the device of hanging the albatross of
30. For a theory contrasting Musgrave's, see N. J. Matzke, Evolution in (Brownian) Space: A
Model for the Origin of the Bacterial Flagellum (Nov. 10, 2003), http://www.talkreason.org/articles/
flag.pdf (proposing a simpler pathway based on the possibility that very crude motility may have
offered Darwinian advantages).
31. For example, Edward 0. Wilson, Harvard's Pellegrino University Professor Emeritus,
debunks theories based on irreducible complexity by asserting that although "[t]here are some
phenomena that have not yet been explained" (such as the bacterial flagellum), nevertheless, the
"default... steadily shrinks as the science of biology expands." Edward 0. Wilson, Intelligent
Evolution: The Consequences of Charles Darwin 's "One Long Argument," HARVARD MAGAZINE,
Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 31-32. The difficulty with this reasoning is that it assumes that the default will
"shrink" in ways predicted by existing theories of biology rather than those hypothesized by those
with whom Wilson disagrees.
32. See supra note 31; see also Daniel L. Hartl, Better Living Through Evolution: The Science of
Novelty and Complexity in Life Forms, HARVARD MAGAZINE, Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 22-27
(debunking theories of irreducible complexity as a "sly dissimulation" created only to "dodge"
holdings in Supreme Court cases, even though "we have limited experimental data" on the formation
of new species).
33. See Wikipedia, Galileo Galilei, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GalileoGalilei (last visited Sept.
28, 2008). Galileo Galilei advocated the heliocentric view of the solar system, i.e., that the earth
traveled around the sun. Id. Pope Urban and many Catholic Church officials instead accepted
Aristotelian geocentricism (a stationary earth) from their interpretations of Biblical Scripture. Id.
Ultimately, the church tried Galileo for heresy, convicted him, required him to recant, banned his
offending book, and sentenced him to imprisonment (later commuted to house arrest). Id. But the
planets sometimes changed direction and backed up (retrogressed) in the sky, and this phenomenon
suggested a flaw in the geocentric model. See DAVID CRUMP, HOW TO REASON ABOUT THE LAW:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 309 (2001).
Politically correct scientists tried to salvage the church's theory by postulating epicycles (the theory
that planetary orbits traced circles traveling upon circles) to explain the phenomenon. Id.
34. See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (granting
declaratory judgment, an injunction, and attorney's fees against a school district that had required
introduction of basic intelligent design ideas); GRIFFIN, supra note 1, at 617-18 (reporting the
cancellation of a philosophy class-not a science class, but a philosophy class-that would have
studied the comparisons among intelligent design, evolution, and other theories).
religion around the necks of irreducible complexity proponents, particularly
when the theory has been accompanied by the natural inference of intelligent
design.35  The nub of the argument is that intelligent design facilitates a
religious sort of philosophy, although it requires neither a deity nor any
religion,36 and that it originated from people and ideas that are religious,
37
although the same could be said of Newton's laws of motion.38 Thus, the
opponents of irreducible complexity argue that governmental
accommodation of intelligent design is an unconstitutional establishment of
religion. The argument of exclusivist natural selectioners is supported by
the claim that intelligent design is unscientific, 39 as well as by the undeniable
fact that irreducible complexity is not nearly so complete a phenomenology
as natural selection.4° Ironically, although the Supreme Court has repeatedly
proclaimed that there is "no such thing as a false idea,' the American Civil
Liberties Union has been particularly effective in using the courts to
suppress irreducible complexity theory by labeling it as a false idea.42
I myself believe that natural selection is overwhelmingly supported by
the evidence. I believe that it is a valid, predictive, and extraordinarily
useful scientific theory. Although I dislike the rhetoric of scientists who
refer to Darwin's themes as "fact," 43 simply because I think such statements
are arrogant and misleading, I would say that, if ever there were a scientific
theory so impregnable as to be described as fact, natural selection would
35. See supra note 34.
36. "The designer is seldom specified, but ... it is most certainly not Satan and his angels, nor
any god or gods conspicuously different from those accepted in the believer's faith." Wilson, supra
note 31, at 3 1. Unfortunately, being Emeritus at Harvard does not ensure against sophistry. Perhaps
the "designer" is not "specified" because identifying a precise designer is not a part of the theory
(and is unknown). Or perhaps there is a design without an identifiable designer: a frequent
occurrence in nature, as when a symmetrical normal curve results from random events or when the
periodic table of the elements shows a clear design. Or perhaps, as in the case of Michael Behe's
theory, irreducible complexity is a hypothesis from data perceived as poorly explained by
evolutionary theory. See BEHE, supra note 18, at 72-73.
37. The inference of unconstitutionality often is based on the support by religious people for the
teaching of intelligent design. See supra note 34. This basis is unsound. See infra Part V.C. 1.
38. "In his own lifetime, Newton wrote more on religion than he did on natural science."
Wikipedia, Isaac Newton, http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/lsaac_-Newton (last visited Sept. 28,
2008). Furthermore, Newton did not follow recognized scientific methods of today but derived his
conclusions from a priori logic within the context of his religious beliefs. Id.
39. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 734.
40. See Wilson, supra note 31, at 31-32 (asserting that irreducible complexity theory is based on
a "default" of knowledge that "steadily shrinks as the science of biology expands").
41. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323,339 (1974); Ollman v. Evans, 471 U.S. 1127,
1129 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
42. Kitzmiller, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 707. The ACLU represented the plaintiffs in Kitzmiller and
successfully took the position that the assertion of any scientific basis for intelligent design was a
false idea. Id.
43. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 23, at 31 (asserting that biologists "are unanimous in concluding
that evolution is afact" and criticizing those who refer to it as a theory).
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qualify. I find natural selection a more persuasive explanation for the
flagellum than I do the intelligent design proposition of irreducible
complexity. 44 But I also believe that refusing to discuss contrary hypotheses
is a poor way of providing answers to difficult questions. Minority theories,
marginal theories, even improbable theories, can pose questions that
encourage mainstream discoveries. 45 In any event, I do not see irreducible
complexity or intelligent design as inherently religious, or at least, I will
argue in this article that it is no more religious than natural selection is itself
a religious doctrine.46 In short, I believe that irreducible complexity theory
should be considered together with natural selection in public schools in a
way that minimizes the overtly religious content of both.
The first part of this article will examine the claim that intelligent design
is "unscientific. 47 This issue requires consideration of the unanswerable
question--"What is science?" It should be added, however, that the
constitutional question is not whether irreducible complexity is "scientific,"
but whether it is "religious" in ways that create an Establishment Clause
violation. Still, the claim that irreducible complexity and intelligent design
are unscientific underlies some of the attacks on these theories, and the
proposition is related to the question whether teaching them can serve
secular purposes. Therefore, the science-or-not issue is relevant even though
it is not the ultimate question.
Next, the article will confront the question whether the teaching of
irreducible complexity achieves secular purposes.48  The article will
conclude that there are such purposes and that they include suggesting
avenues for scientific inquiry, aiding the formulation of hypotheses, and, in
short, spurring development of mainstream evolutionary thought. 49 The list
of secular purposes also will include providing insights into the philosophy
of science that cannot be supplied as well by other ideas; exploring
epistemology, or the nature of evidence and proof in assessing knowledge;
teaching methods of debate that analyze mutually inconsistent arguments;
and, paradoxically, introducing a greater neutrality toward religion than can
be achieved by the teaching of Darwinism alone, which arguably results in
inculcating religious ideas as well as scientific ones.50 Then, too, censorship
44. See infra Part VI.
45. See infra Part III.B.
46. See infra Part V.A.
47. See infra Part I.
48. See infra Part Ill.
49. See infra Part Ill.
50. See infra Part Ill.
of the irreducible complexity critique can have a spillover effect, and
therefore, the article will explore the possibility that avoiding censorship of
other valuable discussion is a valid secular purpose.5' Finally, mature
acceptance of natural selection, as well as the ability to defend it in debate
against intelligent design, requires at least a minimal understanding of the
criticisms implied by irreducible complexity theory.52 In other words, the
article will conclude that students should understand irreducible complexity
in order to be able to argue against it and (if they so decide) to reject it.53
The third section of the article will outline various approaches to the
Establishment Clause, which is the principal basis of legal objections to the
consideration of irreducible complexity theory in public schools.54 The
Lemon test, the endorsement and coercion tests, and the accommodation
doctrines will all be dealt with only briefly, however, because these concepts
have been well developed elsewhere.55 Then, the fourth section of the article
will discuss whether the secular purposes I have suggested can be achieved
without endorsement of or excessive entanglement with religion.56
The final section will contain some of my conclusions.57 I believe that
the discussion in public schools of irreducible complexity can be as
independent of religious content as the teaching of natural selection can be.
This contrarian view does not require that the two concepts be provided
equal time or anything like it, or that they be treated as equally scientific,
valuable, or valid. If I were a high school biology teacher with freedom to
choose, I myself would devote most of the effort to natural selection, with
irreducible complexity touched upon as an alternate idea or as a criticism to
which evolutionary scientists have proposed answers. The precise mixture
would become a question of educational policy. My article will conclude,
however, that the non-religious introduction of irreducible complexity and
intelligent design into the teaching of natural selection would be both
constitutional and desirable.58
II. IS INTELLIGENT DESIGN "SCIENTIFIC"-AND WHAT DOES THIS
QUESTION MEAN?
There is no single theory of science. Instead, there is a variety of views
about what it means to call an assertion "scientific." One of the positive
51. See infra Part I11.
52. See infra Part I11.
53. See infra Part II1.
54. See infra Part IV.
55. See infra Part IV.
56. See infra Part V.
57. See infra Part VI.
58. See infra Part VI.
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benefits of considering irreducible complexity is that the theory seems more
scientific under some definitions than under others. In fact, irreducible
complexity is an ideal candidate for illustrating several possible answers to
the question-"What is science?"
For empiricists or positivists, science depends upon empirical
observation. To put the idea simply, if a proposition does not involve the
testing of data, in this view, it is not science.5 9 But then, there also is the
rationalist view, which holds that science depends on theory.60 Under this
approach, if it does not involve a unifying, rationalizing theory, it is not
science.61 Newton deduced his mechanics as a theoretical exercise without
experiment or hypotheses, and his famous statement, "Hypotheses non
fingo," (i.e., "I don't generate hypotheses") shows the rationalist origins of
his monumental contributions to physics. 62 A third approach sees science as
allowing for quantitative prediction. If you cannot do the mathematics, this
view would hold, you do not have anything scientific. 63 This is a simplistic
sketch of the three approaches, but it will do, as a beginning, for showing
that there are different definitions of science.
Even a superficial examination of these philosophies of science,
however, shows that none is viable alone. The strictest empiricist would
regard a number of data points as scientific, but the smooth line that joins
them together into a theory is not scientific. Strict empiricism would say
that the data points may themselves have been empirically observed, but
each one of the infinite points between them is not yet part of the observed
data. We cannot know whether the smooth line that we interpolate
represents anything real. And so, under the view of an empiricist who
excludes the possibility that a theory can be inferred from incomplete
information, the clump of data that we have collected is just that-a clump
of data-and we cannot make inferences from it. Thus, the strict empiricist
turns out to have nothing, unless there is a concession that some of what the
rationalist demands is needed. On the other hand, theory without
59. See CRUMP, supra note 33, at 301-02; see also DONALD PALMER, DOES THE CENTER HOLD?
AN INTRODUCTION TO WESTERN PHILOSOPHY chs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1996) (explaining the rationalist and
empiricist philosophies); GUNNAR SKIRBEKK & NILS GILJE, A HISTORY OF WESTERN THOUGHT:
FROM ANCIENT GREECE TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY chs. 10, 12, 26 (7th ed. 2000). Much of what
is written in this section overlaps one of my earlier articles, but it is used here in a different way. See
David Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho: Reconsidering the Supreme Court's Philosophy of
Science, 68 Mo. L. REV. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho].
60. See CRUMP, supra note 33, at 302-03.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 303. Literally, "1 don't touch [upon] hypotheses."
63. Id.
observation puts us into the realm of either pure logic or fantasy. No matter
how beautiful the calculations made by a rationalist may be, they are
disconnected from the physical universe if they do not correspond to any
observation. In summary, without the ability both to conjecture about
theories on the one hand and to test or verify them by observation on the
other, none of the approaches alone allows us to do anything with the
theories we generate or data that we collect.
Different philosophers put different spins on the three components.
Thus, there is no universally accepted definition of science. The question-
"What is science?"--sounds easy to answer, but in fact it is difficult.
A. Falsificationists, Verificationists, and Pragmatists
1. Karl Popper's "Falsification" Approach: A Narrow (Perhaps Too
Narrow?) View of Science
The United States Supreme Court has bought heavily into the
"falsificationist" definition of science put forward by Sir Karl Popper.
64
Popper's approach is narrow-so much so that it excludes many people
whom we might readily describe as scientists. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Court based its criteria for admissibility of
scientific evidence on the statement that "[s]cientific methodology today is
based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be
falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from other
fields of human inquiry. 65 The Court justified this view by quoting
Popper's statement that "the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its
falsifiability, or refutability, or testability. 66 In considering the reliability of
a statement or opinion, the Daubert Court stated as its primary criterion the
characteristic of "falsifiability," or whether the underlying theory "can be
(and has been) tested. '" 67
In a concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist modestly admitted that he did
not understand what falsifiability meant.68 He had a point because the rest of
the Court certainly did not understand it. Under Popper's concept of
falsifiability, the scientific status of a statement does not depend upon
whether the statement already "has been" tested; falsifiability means only
64. See Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
65. Id. at 593 (quoting ERIC GREEN & CHARLES NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES & MATERIALS ON
EVIDENCE 645 (1983)).
66. Id. at 593 (quoting KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5thed. 1989)).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 600 (Rehnquist, J. concurring).
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that the proposed statement theoretically might be tested.69  The broad
implications of this idea are well developed. They have been discussed in
college texts for more than twenty years. For example, Gunnar Skirbekk
and Nils Gilje point out that Popper demanded falsifiability only "in
principle," perhaps by means not yet available; means that might be invented
in the future.70 Any other approach would make a nonscientist of the
theoretical physicist. It would also contradict the title of Popper's own
book, the first word of which is "[c]onjectures."" After all, a major part of
science is the formation of hypotheses. When hypotheses are created for the
first time, of course, they have not yet "been tested." Consider the famous
Michelson-Morley experiment, which used ingenious methods to measure
the speed of light.72 Before that time, theoretical physicists had deduced a
great deal about the subject from known relationships. Surely, the absence
of testing in those early days (until Michelson and Morley invented the
means) did not demote those physicists into non-scientists.
Thus, if we can conceive of any way in which a particular statement
might be testable in the future, this should be enough, under Popper's theory,
to let us call the statement "scientific." In fact, even if we cannot conceive
the way, but if testing of the statement might be possible someday by means
that are as yet unknown, this possibility should be enough to make the
statement "scientific." For example, Einstein and others have posited the
existence of tachyons, particles that travel faster than light, as a consequence
of reasoning based on the theory of relativity.73 We have never tested this
hypothesis because it is difficult to pin down a tachyon. But should this
mean that the prediction of tachyons is unscientific? And if so, were all of
the predictions from relativity, including those that since have been tested
and corroborated, "unscientific" when Albert Einstein conceived them?
Some day, we might be able to test tachyons. Thus, an appropriate
understanding of Popper's theory would allow the tachyon conjecture to be
treated as falsifiable because of the "someday" possibility.
74
Popper's insistence upon the sole criterion of falsifiability raises deeper
issues.75 As is often the case with singular fixations, it does not fit all cases.
69. POPPER, supra note 66, at 37.
70. SKIRBEKK & GLUE, supra note 59, at 429.
71. POPPER, supra note 66.
72. See ALEXANDER KOLIN, PHYSICS: ITS LAWS, IDEAS AND METHODS 840-41 (1950).
73. See Wikipedia, Tachyons, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tachyon (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
74. Cf SKIRBEKK & GILJE, supra note 59, at 429-33 (discussing the meaning of Popper's
theories).
75. POPPER, supra note 66, at 37 (making this "the criterion" of science), quoted in Daubert v.
Thus, Skirbekk and Gilje point out that there is a whole range of statements
that really should be considered scientific but that Popper's criterion
excludes:
[W]hat about the statement, "the average temperature on the surface
of the earth when the human race is extinct, will be 70EC"? This
statement is, in principle, not falsifiable since no one will be alive to
falsify it (assuming that no other intelligent creatures replace human
beings). But is this statement, then, cognitively meaningless, and
not scientific? Scientists would probably be reluctant to draw this
conclusion: they would hardly think that such statements are
scientifically meaningless.
76
A statement of this kind can be evaluated by various methods: by
subtracting an estimate of human contributions from current average
temperatures, for example, or by consulting prehistoric averages. But the
statement cannot be falsified because it cannot be tested by experiment.
Popper himself recognized this difficulty and later compromised with
rationalism, even using the term "critical rationalism" to describe his own
approach.77 This concession arguably salvages the scientific status of fields
such as logic, mathematics, or game theory, which are not falsifiable as a
matter of principle. 78 But it is important to distinguish this brand of critical
rationalism, which accepts inferences of various legitimate types, from
Popper's other theory, with its single focus upon testability.
And this is only the beginning of the Supreme Court's misunderstanding
of Popper. Although the Court used Popper's falsifiability criterion as one
of the determinants of evidentiary reliability, Popper himself denied that
science could ever become "reliable. 7 9  No matter how many times we
observed a given phenomenon, said Popper, we could not confirm the theory
that we have inferred from it; we could only "falsify" the theory if it failed to
produce the expected outcome.80  Science became, then, a body of
knowledge composed of theories that had been discarded or falsified
because experiments had resulted in contrary observations, and a remaining
body of theories that had not been falsified but that had to be regarded as
forever unconfirmed. Furthermore, according to Popper, the "corroboration"
of a theory by non-falsification did not amount to "confirmation" because
Merrel Dow Pharnns., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
76. See SKIRBEKK & GILJE, supra note 59, at 429.
77. Id. at 429-31.
78. Id.
79. KARL POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 18, 22 (1972).
80. Id.
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corroborating data represented its past performance only.81 We could not
assume that the theory would hold true in future experiments. 82 One might
rely on the theory of gravity in deciding not to jump off the Empire State
Building because of a commonsense prediction that one would fall, but no
matter how many times one saw the theory escape falsification, one could
not count gravity as a reliable, confirmed principle. Thus, ironically, the
Supreme Court quoted Popper in support of a concept of reliability that
Popper himself had rejected.
2. The Verificationists' Broader Approach: Science as Logical
Inference, or Verification from Evidence
Popper's theory of science was an effort at "demarcation": the effort to
define science in a way that distinguishes it from other types of inquiry or
learning.83  Other philosophers have denied the possibility of sharp
demarcation. For example, "verificationists," such as Rudolf Camap8 4 and
Hans Reichenbach,"5 consider science to include a "continuum" of different
types of inferences from observation and evidence, although they emphasize
empirical support. In other words, one can infer inductively that gravity
works, and then deduce that jumping off the Empire State Building will
cause a person to fall.
The verificationist approach sees all learning from observation and
theorization as scientific, ranging from what might be called common sense
to the most abstruse aspects of cosmology.8 6 There is no one "scientific
method," according to this approach. Instead, one reasons inductively and
produces scientific hypotheses, which are verified or refuted by evidence.
Still others, such as Carl G. Hempel, see testing as important, along with
Popper, but argue that other kinds of reasoning can be scientific too.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Susan Haack, Trial and Error: The Supreme Court's Philosophy of Science, 95 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH (Supp. 1) S67 (2005).
84. See, e.g., RUDOLF CARNAP, THE CONTINUUM OF INDUCTIVE METHODS (1952); see also
Wikipedia, Rudolf Carnap, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RudolphCamap (last visited Sept. 28,
2008).
85. See, e.g., HANS REICHENBACH, THE RISE OF SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY (1951); see also
Wikipedia, Hans Reichenbach, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans-Reichenbach (last visited Sept. 28,
2008).
86. See Haack, supra note 83, at S67. It should be added that this approach describes so-called
"weak" verificationism, which accepts propositions that the evidence shows are probable. "Strong"
verificationism accepts only propositions that are conclusive, but that approach is generally
discredited.
Hempel also argued that confirmation results from repeated non-
falsification, with the degree of confirmation depending upon the strength of
the evidence.87 Popper's falsifiability criterion, according to Hempel,
"involves a very severe restriction of the possible forms of scientific
hypotheses. 88
To see the differences produced by these alternate approaches, consider
again Skirbekk and Gilje's problematic sentence: "[T]he average
temperature on the surface of the earth when the human race is extinct will
be 70EC."' 9 It will be impossible to test this assertion by experiment after
all of the possible experimenters are gone. Popper's definition of science
therefore marks this statement as unscientific, however dubious this
conclusion may seem.90  The more tolerant verificationist approach,
however, allows for the drawing of inferences as a means of scientific
inquiry.91  Thus, we can attempt to verify the "70EC" statement by
subtracting an estimate of human contributions from existing temperatures,
by consulting prehistoric averages, or by undertaking any number of other
calculations that will provide arguments for or against the statement.
Verificationists might find any given result of these calculations either
persuasive or unpersuasive, but they would not reject such methods as
unscientific merely because the statement cannot be falsified. 92
The verificationist approach also implies that science can include proof
by negative inference, which is sometimes called proof by elimination or
reductio ad absurdum.93 Logicians ranging from the ancient Greeks to
Sherlock Holmes have used this method, but the classic example is Euclid's
proof that the catalogue of prime numbers is infinite, which he composed by
showing that the opposite conclusion is erroneous.94 In fact, there are other
87. See CARL G. HEMPEL, Studies in the Logic of Confirmation, in ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC
EXPLANATION AND OTHER ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 3, 3-46 (1965); CARL. G.
HEMPEL, Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance: Problems and Changes, in supra, at 101,
101-20.
88. See HEMPEL, Studies in the Logic of Confirmation, supra note 87, at 43-45.
89. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
93. "[O]ne assumes a claim for the sake of argument, derives an absurd or ridiculous outcome,
and then concludes that the original assumption must have been wrong as it led to an absurd result."
See Wikipedia, Reductio ad Absurdum, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductio-ad-absurdum (last
visited Sept. 28, 2008). Reductio ad absurdum is also called the "apagological argument," "proof by
contradiction," or "proof by the law of excluded middle." Id.
94. See id. Euclid's proof is as follows: suppose there are only finitely many primes. Compile
the complete list, p, to p.. Then, find the number P = (p, x P2 x ... p.) + 1. Now, this P cannot be a
multiple of any of the "little p's" because division will leave a remainder of 1. Therefore, P must be
a prime. In conclusion, the original supposition is eliminated as false, and there must be infinitely
many primes. See id.
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important scientific techniques that depend upon proof by elimination. For
example, the Federal Judicial Center's Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence suggests that disease causation is determinable through a
"differential diagnosis," from which the pathologist "considers all relevant
potential causes of the symptoms and then eliminates alternative causes
based on a physical examination, clinical tests, and a thorough case
history."95  Thus, a differential diagnosis does not attempt to falsify the
resulting diagnosis by experiment; rather, it uses proof by elimination. Still,
any disciple of Popper who deduces that the differential diagnosis method is
"unscientific" is in the position of disparaging a thinking pattern that many
scientists find valuable.
Inferences from irreducible complexity provide another example of
proof by elimination. In effect, the proponent begins by saying the
following: "Suppose for argument's sake that the bacterial flagellum evolved
through natural selection." The irreducible complexity proponent then
attempts to demonstrate that this conclusion is absurd by examining the
complexity of the mechanism, showing the interdependence of its parts, and
then comparing the result to the paradigm of natural selection. I find this
argument difficult to accept, but I would resist the conclusion that the
underlying method of reasoning by elimination is unscientific, even if it
means that the conclusion is not falsifiable by an experiment congenial to
Popper. This is especially so when there is no consensus about any pathway
for creating the flagellum by natural selection, much less a clear method of
testing or falsifying such a pathway. Thus, whether the irreducible
complexity conjecture is scientific depends in part upon whether one
rigorously follows Popper in every case-which I think is hard to do96-or
whether one accepts the broader methods of the verificationists at least some
of the time. Arguments against irreducible complexity and intelligent design
often fail to recognize the difference between falsificationist and
verificationist approaches to science, and they tend not to credit proof by
elimination under either theory. 97 This is a flaw in the argument of those
who oppose the teaching of irreducible complexity.
95. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 214 (1994).
96. Insisting upon falsification arguably makes nonscientists out of many scholars who seem to
deserve the label, from paleontologists to biological taxonomists. See infra Part lI.B.
97. In McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1267 (E.D. Ark. 1982), the
court stated that, "[t]he essential characteristics of science are: (1) It is guided by natural law; (2) It
has to be explanatory by reference to natural law; (3) It is testable against the empirical world; (4) Its
conclusions are tentative ... ; and (5) It is falsifiable." This definition obscures the difference
between verificationists (who seem to be included in the third criterion, "It is testable against the
3. William James and the Pragmatists: Testing Science by "What
Works"
Still others adopt a pragmatic definition of science. William James, for
example, considered that a scientific statement came to represent truth if it
proved its utility for solving concrete problems over the long term.98 The
opposite was not exactly falsification but a failure of workability, by which a
proposition ceased to provide a helpful option.99 F.C.S. Schiller developed
the idea that scientific truth was relative to specific problems.' 00 If someone
wants to return home, for example, the "true" answer will be whatever
works to help that person to achieve that purpose.'0 ' To quote a more
modem and entertaining source, namely, Professor Robert Adair in The
Physics of Baseball: "In his analysis of a real system, a physicist constructs a
well-defined model of the system and addresses the model."' '
Thus, an equation, principle, or model is scientific only in context and
only to the extent it has pragmatic value in helping an individual to solve an
identifiable problem. The phenomenon that we know as light, for example,
may be treated by particle theory (light is particles, like infinitesimal
baseballs) or wave theory (light is waves). 10 3  Particle theory is useful in
addressing certain issues such as the photoelectric effect, whereas wave
theory is more useful in explaining phenomena such as color or
empirical world") and falsificationists (who insist, as in the fifth criterion, that science must be
"falsifiable"). See also Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 404 F. Supp. 2d 707, 735 (M.D. Pa.
2005) (referring to "testable, natural explanations" or those "inferred from the confirmable data,"
such as verificationists might accept, without distinguishing the falsificationist approach). As for
proof by elimination, the Kitzmiller court apparently considered it flatly illegitimate: "[Intelligent
design] proponents primarily argue for design through negative arguments against
evolution .... However, we believe that arguments against evolution are not arguments for
design... just because scientists cannot explain today how biological systems evolved does not
mean that they cannot, and will not, explain them tomorrow." Id. at 738. The Kitzmiller court's
reasoning here is sophistry. First, irreducible complexity can have scientific value even if its
opponents may someday propose possible answers to its criticisms because conjecture that leads to
new insights is valuable even if the conjecture someday proves wrong. See infra notes 138-40 and
accompanying text. Science is "tentative," after all. Second, the burden on proponents is not to
obliterate the opposition conclusively in all respects and for all time; instead, at least under a
verificationist approach, it is to construct their arguments by inferences from evidence, which may
include proof by elimination.
98. WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM, A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING:
POPULAR LECTURES OF PHILOSOPHY 204-07 (1907).
99. See id.; see also Wikipedia, Pragmatism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmatism (last
visited Sept. 28, 2008).
100. Pragmatism, supra note 99.
101. Id.
102. ROBERT K. ADAIR, THE PHYSICS OF BASEBALL 1-2 (2d ed. 1994).
103. See ROLAND LANE REESE, UNIVERSITY PHYSICS 602-04, 1053-54, 1104-05, 1235-39
(Keith Dodson & Beth Wilbur eds., 2000).
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interference.'0 4 In other respects, tiny baseballs and roiled oceans have only
the faintest resemblance to light, and as constructs within the human mind
they seem contradictory (how can light consist of little baseballs and, at the
same time, consist of waves?), but the two models both are scientific to the
extent that they are useful to solve the particular problems to which they are
adapted.
My own statement elsewhere of a proposed test for evaluating scientific
models, for example, expands traditional criteria of tractability, simplicity,
and empirical verification into six factors: communicability, computational
tractability, simplicity of elements, generality, empirical accuracy, and
recognizability of the limits of the theory.0 5 In this view, whether a
statement is scientific depends on simultaneous evaluation of these six
indicia, as well as the use to which we plan to put the theory. 0 6  The
"meatball" vision of an atom, as composed of orbiting electrons, might be
"scientific" if we are trying to explain the subject to fourth graders, but for
more sophisticated purposes, it is inaccurate and falsified-and we might
need something more complicated, such as Schrodinger's wave equation.'0 7
Pragmatism might be called the "American" model of science, as
opposed to the British school represented by Popper. The American
approach is to treat scientific theories as scientific if they "work"-a
distinctly American concern.'08
B. The Trouble with Definitions of Science
Popper's theory has the merit of distinguishing science from some other
bodies of belief or knowledge that should be regarded as unscientific.' 0 9 For
example, moral precepts such as the Golden Rule ("do unto others") are not
testable. Likewise, prescientific myths, religious beliefs, and pure
mathematics are not science. Furthermore, Popper helps us to realize that
104. Id.
105. Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho, supra note 59, at 28-39.
106. Id.
107. See REESE, supra note 103, at 163 (describing the meatball version, also known as the "Bohr
model"). Reese also provides a reasonably accessible explanation of the quantum mechanics model,
although useful models require mathematics that would resemble a forest of squiggles to most
people. Id. at 1260, 1263-64. An intermediate conception, the "plum pudding model," conceives of
the electron as a charged mass or cloud. Id. at 763.
108. Cf 25 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 667-76, 678-92 (1989) (including the observation that
although Popper was Austrian, his falsification criterion is identified with the British view, whereas
the American view has emphasized "what works").
109. See Haack, supra note 83 and accompanying text (introducing the concept of "demarcation").
new data can change the result of testing. l0 If we were to examine
American attitudes toward school desegregation in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s,
and 2000s, for example, we might draw theories about what the empirical
results mean that would change with time, and Popper would have alerted us
to watch for this.
But the trouble is that Popper's criterion might logically wind up
labeling as "pseudoscientific" a number of disciplines that we might think
deserve the label of science. For example, we cannot test the hypotheses
made by paleontologists. Their conjecture that dinosaurs may be the
ancestors of birds, for instance, can be corroborated by numerous kinds of
observations and by induction and deduction from them, 1 ' but we cannot
experiment very well with paleontology. Specifically, we cannot test the
idea that dinosaurs produced birds, nor can we figure an observational
manner of falsifying the hypothesis if it happens not to be true. If we
address the question by the method of the verificationists, however, we come
to the opposite conclusion. The paleontologist uses evidence, together with
induction and analogy, to conclude from successive fossils that the
progression from dinosaurs to birds is likely to have occurred. For the
verificationist, who sees less demarcation between science and other types of
reasoning, this is enough. But if we apply a strict and exclusive test of
falsifiability, the paleontologist is not a scientist.12
Furthermore, Popper's definition makes a non-scientist out of anyone
whose work consists more of rationalist correlation of data than of
observation. For example, the falsificationist approach forces us to conclude
that a biological taxonomist, who infers relationships among species and
classifies them by similar characteristics, is not a scientist. The assignment
of organisms to phyla and species, which are definitional constructs, cannot
be tested by experiment. Thus, the statement that a whale is a mammal must
be unscientific, if we strictly apply Popper's philosophy." 3  A whale
resembles other mammals in some respects, it is true; but there are also ways
in which it differs from, say, a horse, which the taxonomist tells us is also a
mammal. It might be equally supportable by observation to create a
classificatory system by which a whale is treated as a fish. 1 4 The existing
110. See supra notes 79-81 (discussing the absence of confirmation).
I 11. This corroboration has created an "almost universal consensus." See Wikipedia, Dinosaur,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dinosaur (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
112. The qualifier, "a strict and exclusive" test of falsifiability, is important here. Popper's views
actually changed from time to time, and he sometimes applied his falsifiability test in varying ways.
See infra note 120 and accompanying text (containing a striking example). The point here, however,
is that without respect to the conclusions Popper reached about whether certain specific disciplines
were or were not "scientific," we eliminate many kinds of putative scientists if we faithfully apply
his falsifiability test according to its terms.
113. See supra note 112.
114. For example, if we describe a "fish" as a vertebrate that lives exclusively in an aquatic
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classificatory system might appeal to a pragmatist, who would see it as
useful in generating hypotheses, and it might also appeal to an inductivist or
verificationist who accepts evidence of various kinds in support of
inferences, not just experimental observation. But the falsificationist theory
is narrow-minded, and it shuts out the biological taxonomist if it is applied
exclusively according to its terms.
Moreover, Popper excludes learned men and women who have
contributed mightily to the growths of their disciplines as sciences.
Consider Sigmund Freud, for example, whom Popper specifically intended
to exclude.115 Freud's theories of the subconscious were based upon
observation, although they were not systematically recorded or controlled. 1
6
The rationalist elements of Freud's proposal of the "dream censor," for
example, along with other aspects of his theory of dreams, were based upon
Freud's years of listening to patients' free associations, but they reflected
Freud's intellectual constructs even more." 7  Today, many psychologists
have no use for Freud, although some of his theories have come to be
accepted through observation or experiment. 18 The trouble with denying
him a place in science, however, is that the methods that he used, the
questions that he asked, and the hypotheses that he generated have led to the
development of theories that unquestionably allow prediction-and therefore
testing. Popper's views do not leave room for the critic who questions or the
great thinker who surpasses his time.
Thus, almost any effort at demarcating science will raise the question,
"If it advances science, isn't it worthy of being called science (or at least,
being considered valuable to science), even if it doesn't rigorously fit
someone's definition of 'science'?" Isn't a good question-a suggestion for
fruitful inquiry-a part of science, even if it isn't falsifiable (or even
verifiable)? Isn't the theorist (even the radical theorist, like Galileo or
Darwin) who ultimately turns out to be wrong" 9 still a "scientist" if the
theory produces other theories that are "scientific"?
environment and uses fins or a tail for locomotion, then a whale becomes a "fish." The definition
might even have some slight appeal to pragmatists because we could predict certain similarities
among species of "fish" defined this way (e.g., in skin characteristics). The real point, however, is
that neither classification of a whale-as a mammal, or as a fish-can be falsified.
115. See POPPER, supra note 66, at 33-69.
116. See CRUMP, supra note 33, at 351-54.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. Galileo was spectacularly wrong sometimes. For example, he denied that the moon had
anything to do with causing tides. See Galileo Galilei, supra note 33.
C. Science, Intelligent Design, and Natural Selection
One might think that Popper would have an easy time in recognizing
Darwinian natural selection as a scientific hypothesis. Strangely, one would
be quite wrong. The natural selection question was a difficult one for
Popper. Professor Susan Haack describes the twists and turns that Popper
went through in considering this question:
Indeed, Popper himself doesn't seem quite sure how to apply his
criterion. Sometimes, for example, he says that the theory of
evolution is not falsifiable, and, so, is not science; at one point, he
suggests that "survival of the fittest" is a tautology, or "near-
tautology," and elsewhere that evolution is really a historical theory,
or perhaps metaphysics. Then, he changes his mind: evolution is
science, after all.
120
At first blush, it seems sensible to conclude that Popper finally got it
right with the last conclusion because instinct tells us that natural selection is
subject to falsification. Through experiment with a controlled biota, one can
demonstrate that a process of natural selection results, or so we might
surmise. But then again, one can ask whether this experiment really would
give us the potential for falsifying the theory if it were untrue. We can begin
with a given biota and note its change over time, or we can control some
aspects of the biota and see what happens. And then, we will have data that
shows that the system changed because we began with one set of flora and
fauna and ended with another. But in the end, we should ask whether this
data really matters-whether we have tested the "survival of the fittest" in
any meaningful way. We have shown that the biota changed, and that the
fittest survived, but because we define those that survived as the fittest, have
we really tested anything other than the metaphysics or the tautology that
makes us surmise or guess that it is the "fittest" that have survived? If not,
then Popper's earlier view was correct, and natural selection is a "near
tautology." The "fittest" have survived because we label those that survived
as the fittest.
But the real point is that, even if we can call this experiment with
changing biota a chance for falsification, it is difficult to say that we can do
so for all aspects of evolutionary biology that we might consider to be
scientific. Paleontology, for example, remains elusive. It is difficult to test
the idea that birds evolved from dinosaurs by means that could falsify the
120. Haack, supra note 83, at S67 (citing KARL POPPER, Natural Selection and Its Scientific
Status, in A POCKET POPPER 239, 239-46 (David Miller ed., 1983)).
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theory, although we may be able to infer it from ample evidence., 2  We can
study fossils and note that scales became more like feathers over time and
appendages more like wings. But this is the method of inductivists or
verificationists, not of the scientist who insists on falsifiability122 Similarly,
the biological taxonomist is still a non-scientist, irrespective of the evidence
that supports his hypotheses.12 3  And then, there is the example of the
bacterial flagellum. Biologists have proposed evolutionary pathways for the
development of flagella, as I have observed in an earlier part of this
article.1 24 But then, how do we test these flagellum-development theories in
a manner that will falsify them if they actually are untrue? Some scientists
seem confident of discovering means for empirical testing of flagellum
evolutionary theories. 125 The fact is, we simply do not know whether there
are such means or not.
D. Does It Matter Whether Irreducible Complexity Is or Is Not Science If
We Already Teach It in Teaching Natural Selection?
One point to be made before proceeding further is that whether
irreducible complexity theory meets any particular definition of science is
not the ultimate issue. Most disciplines taught in public schools are not
sciences. History, mathematics, English literature, and foreign languages are
worthy of learning, and yet they are not sciences. Instead, the legal issue is
whether coverage of irreducible complexity or intelligent design in a biology
class is an establishment of religion. This issue, in turn, depends upon
which of the Supreme Court's several approaches to the Establishment
Clause we choose to use, and how we happen to apply it.'2 6 The separate
issue-whether it is wise to include the subject-is a political question,
depending upon our evaluation of the utility of including it and the resources
consumed in doing so, or the costs and benefits. Both questions may depend
in part upon whatever secular purposes there may be for teaching intelligent
design. 127
121. See supra note Il1 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 7, 29 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Musgrave, supra note 7 (proposing means of testing); see also supra notes 29-30
and accompanying text (explaining Musgrave's and Matzke's proposed pathways).
126. See infra Part IV (discussing the Establishment Clause).
127. See infra Part III (discussing the secular purposes derived from teaching intelligent design).
And it should immediately be added that we already teach irreducible
complexity and intelligent design in teaching natural selection.
Paradoxically, it is necessary to raise the theory of intelligent design in
biology classes and definitively to reject it if we are to teach evolution; it is
virtually impossible to do otherwise. 28  The teaching is usually done in
dogmatic fashion, consisting of firm, unquestioning denunciation of
intelligent design as erroneous. Specifically, understanding natural selection
requires clear absorption of the principle that natural selection depends upon
random events. It is non-purposive. For neophytes to comprehend natural
selection, they must first eradicate the notion, however universally intuitive
it may be, that the origin of species has any design behind it whatsoever.
129
In fact, reasoning about natural selection requires students to make a
serious effort at wringing every dollop of purpose out of their scientific
statements. The observation that "the leopard grew its spots so that it could
develop better camouflage," for example, is inconsistent with natural
selection. Instead, the evolutionist's mode of thinking would sound
something like, "Individual pre-leopard organisms happened by chance to
produce spots (or precursors of spots), and these individuals procreated in
greater numbers so that their offspring were naturally selected in their biota
to become today's leopards."13 Similarly, it is bad reasoning to assert that
"giraffes grew long necks so that they could reach leaves on higher
branches." The evolutionist's mode of thinking might instead propose that
"precursors of giraffes survived and propagated at higher rates when their
necks were longer, which happened as a result of random mutations."
Statements attributing purposeful development in species are properly
called "teleological" statements. Teleology is an umbrella word referring to
modes of thinking that explain phenomena by reference to unifying
purposes, rational development, or, for that matter, intelligent design.'3 ' An
instructor simply must eliminate teleological thinking of these kinds if the
instructor is to teach natural selection meaningfully. Thus, the teacher must
act to countermand statements such as "the leopard grew his spots for
camouflage" or "the giraffe's long neck developed so it could reach higher
128. This is so because "[p]opular reasoning about 'evolution' ... is subject to a variety of errors,
of which probably the most prevalent is inferring purpose in mutation." CRUMP, supra note 33, at
281 (emphasis added). In other words, the easy (but erroneous) inference is that since organisms
sometimes can improve their Darwinian selection through adaptation, they must be exercising some
unseen faculty to adapt, all for the purpose of surviving. Individuals do indeed exercise various
faculties to survive. The error, however, consists in attributing this survival purpose to the entire
species, as a species, or even in attributing the purpose to their biota as a whole.
129. Cf id. at 281 (giving examples such as those in the next paragraph of the text as illustrations
of erroneous applications of the theory, and explaining why they are "fallacious," as a means of
teaching the random nature of natural selection). See also infra note 135 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
131. See CRUMP, supra note 33, at 209-10, 281.
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vegetation." Teleological thinking, specifically the kind of teleological
thinking inspired by irreducible complexity theory and referred to as
intelligent design, must be eliminated root and branch. Thus, we already
teach about intelligent design whenever we teach evolution. In other words,
we set it up as a straw man, and then we inculcate the doctrine that it is
wrong.
The raising and rejecting of intelligent design is such a necessary part of
teaching natural selection that the subject usually is mentioned and
disapproved uncritically, as an idea that simply must be discarded as a
matter of the teacher's mere assertion. 132 Consider the following
recommended means of denouncing any inference of purpose in the origin of
species, quoted from a major high school biology book: "Address
Misconceptions .... Give students the following example, which is typical
of what they might read in a textbook: 'The bird evolved a larger beak.'
This sounds as though an individual bird has intentionally changed its
biological traits. Ask: What would be a more accurate way of stating
this?' 3 3  The desired answer must be something like the following:
"Mutations produced a larger beak in some individual birds and led to
greater survival and propagation of those birds." Thus, the teacher's guide
to this high school text encourages the raising of a purposeful or intentional
force (an intelligent design), followed by the dogmatic rejection of the entire
notion as a "misconception." Other teaching books contain similar dogmatic
presentations. For example, one book pronounces that "evolutionary change
occurs without any 'goals."" 134 "The idea that evolution is not directed
toward a final goal has been ... difficult for people to accept ....
Again, I recognize that the teaching of evolution requires the teacher to
make this point, and I concur with that approach. However, I object to the
pretense that the teacher is not teaching intelligent design, because she is.
She also is teaching that it should be rejected dogmatically without any
reasoning whatsoever.
I do not wish to be misunderstood, and therefore I repeat: I believe that
natural selection is overwhelmingly supported by the evidence. It should be
taught as a view of reality that explains vast reaches of phenomena
consistently with observation. And when it is taught, the necessity of
132. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
133. KENNETH R. MILLER & JOSEPH LEVINE, TEACHER'S EDITION BIOLOGY 376 (Tex. ed. 2004).
This book is published by Prentice Hall, a well-known publisher of high school texts.
134. PURVES ETAL., supra note 13, at 3.
135. Id.
avoiding any vestige of teleological thinking should also be taught. My
contrarian view is not based upon any rejection of natural selection or of its
inconsistency with teleology. Again, what I object to is the pretense that
biology courses do not already cover intelligent design by uncritically
denouncing it when they teach natural selection. I also think that there are
many sound reasons for considering irreducible complexity as a separate
theory, with slightly more suspension of disbelief than those who would
exclude it from the public square are willing to indulge in today, and this is
the subject of the next section of this article.
III. WHAT IS TO BE GAINED BY STUDYING IRREDUCIBLE COMPLEXITY?: A
CATALOGUE OF SECULAR PURPOSES
The previous part of this article has discussed science and its varying
definitions. 136 This part will build upon that discussion by identifying a
number of secular purposes that can be served by the teaching of irreducible
complexity. Cataloging and explaining those purposes is useful not only for
its own sake-to evaluate whether the study of irreducible complexity is
worthwhile as a matter of policy-but also to consider whether it results in
an unconstitutional establishment of religion if done in public schools. The
constitutional question will be addressed in a later section, after the secular
purposes are considered. 37
A. Better Understanding of the Nature of Science
The history of science is littered with the wreckage of theories that
failed. The Ptolemaic universe, for example, proposed an earth-centered
universe orbited by the sun and planets.'38 Politically correct astronomers of
an earlier time even dreamed up epicyclic planetary movements to conform
the theory to observations of "regression," when planets seemed to backtrack
in the sky.139 The Copernican universe, which in its early forms appears to
have treated orbits as circular, improved on the Ptolemaic universe by
having the earth circumnavigate the sun, and later recognition of elliptical
orbits improved the theory still.' 40 As imperfect as the Ptolemaic universe
may have been, however, it was an improvement over conceptions of the sun
as powered by a deity driving a fiery chariot. But then, even pre-scientific
136. See supra Part 11.
137. See infra Part V.
138. See CRUMP, supra note 33, at 309-10.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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creation myths of that kind have been recognized as the beginnings of
modem cosmology. 14' Such is the nature of science.
Biology has seen similar false developments as counterparts to natural
selection. Lamarckian evolution, for example, proposed the inheritance of
acquired characteristics. 142 If the life experience of a particular organism
caused it to acquire strength, or markings, or higher intelligence,
Lamarckians believed that its offspring would inherit those characteristics.143
This theory is discredited by observation; it has been falsified.'" Other
discarded alternatives have explained the development of species by
spontaneous generation, or in other words by creation of conditions
hospitable to particular organisms in the manner of food scraps "generating"
rats or humid wood "generating" mold.145 Still another theory has explained
the origin of species by suggesting that developed life forms were introduced
into the biosphere by celestial bodies falling to earth. 46
It may be useful to introduce discredited ideas of this kind at the
beginning stages of teaching evolution so that the student can examine the
evidence that falsifies them. These alternative theories mirror ideas that
people are accustomed to accepting, even if they are founded on unscientific
concepts. Thus, the teaching of evolution may prove more successful if it
includes a segment that contrasts natural selection with discredited, but
easily accepted, theories. The fundamental nature of evolution as a
phenomenon founded on random processes may be better understood this
way. In fact, courts have recognized a possible value in teaching theories
that have failed-and showing why. 1
47
None of these alternative ideas provides a counterpoint to evolutionary
science nearly so well, however, as irreducible complexity. The inference
for this counter-hypothesis is supportable by various kinds of evidence,
ranging from the nature of the earth as hospitable to life, to the hierarchy of
species, and to the design of the solar system. It is too easy to falsify
141. See Wilson, supra note 31, at 33 ("Creation myths were in a sense the beginning of science
itself.").
142. CRUMP, supra note 33, at 281-82.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1269 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (proposing that,
as a foil to evolution and as an example of a false theory, public schools use a theory based on
comets striking earth and depositing pre-life-form material, instead of purposive (teleological)
theories).
147. Id.
Lamarckian evolution or spontaneous generation. 148 It also is possible to
falsify irreducible complexity, at least in many, if not most, applications.
149
However, irreducible complexity is more stubborn, and it is impossible to
demonstrate or test evolution by natural selection as an explanation for some
phenomena as of yet.150 For this reason, irreducible complexity makes a
better foil to natural selection. In fact, the naturalness of the inference of
irreducible complexity furnishes a reason why intelligent design is usually
taught (or taught about)-as a theory to be denounced without analysis-
whenever evolution is taught.' 5
Furthermore, investigation of the history of science is often viewed as
integral to the understanding of science. For example, many psychologists
today may have no use for Freud and may not regard his theories as
scientific, but a survey course about psychology would sensibly include
examination of Freud's work as a means of understanding how the field of
psychology has developed.'52 Besides, some of Freud's theories have been
corroborated by later experimentation, even though many Freudian theories
either have not survived observation or cannot be falsified or
corroborated.' 53
In summary, one would understand natural selection more completely
by considering counterparts that may be false, true, or only true some of the
time. Thus, teaching about Lamarckian evolution as a false theory helps
students to understand evolution by natural selection. Teaching about
irreducible complexity as a theory that does not explain many kinds of
observations but conceivably (perhaps barely conceivably) may explain a
few-and that cannot yet be falsified in those areas, although possibly it will
be someday-may provide an even better way of enhancing understanding
of natural selection.
B. Stimulation of New Scientific Inquiries
Criticism of new or established theories is a part of science. The
development of the Copernican universe, for example, was spurred by
observations of planetary movement that seemed to disprove established
thought. 54 Astronomers proposed that planets traveled in epicycles to solve
148. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (proposing evolutionary pathways for the
development of the bacterial flagellum and means of testing them-means that potentially would
falsify the irreducible complexity conjecture).
150. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (discussing testing methods that have been
proposed).
151. See supra Part lI.D.
152. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
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this problem.' 5  The planets stubbornly failed, however, to conform to these
theories.156 The focus that is brought to a problem by criticism and proposed
solutions supports the development of science even if the proffered theory
turns out to be wrong.
157
Theories that are precursors of irreducible complexity have, in fact,
spurred the development of evolutionary science. Critics of natural selection
pointed to the absence of what they called "transitional forms" in the fossil
record.' 58 A simplistic view of evolution might view it as a smooth process
of "evolutionary" change, in which transitions from a remote ancestor go
through identifiable intermediate stages. The trouble with this idea was that
fossils in some instances showed what appeared instead to reflect sharp
changes, and critics argued that this evidence undermined the theory of
evolution.159  In response, biologists developed a theory of "punctuated
equilibrium."'' 60 In time, a biota reaches a relatively stable phase in which
organisms do not evolve rapidly because although there are random
mutations, nothing in nature causes them to be naturally selected. 16' But
then, a catastrophe changes the playing field. It may come in the form of
planetary temperature increases, an ice age, or the collision of two tectonic
plates that creates a land bridge introducing new predators. 62  In this
situation, the change brought about by natural selection begins suddenly,
proceeds rapidly, and involves large sectors of the biota. Evolution is a
misleading term unless one understands that it can proceed with dramatic
leaps in short time frames and that long periods of relative equilibrium can
be punctuated by moments of rapid change. This insight was encouraged by
the opponents of natural selection. 63  In other words, the creationists'
criticisms may have been wrong in the minds of most scientists, but our
understanding of evolution improved because of questions such as the ones
they raised.
Irreducible complexity theory has already performed a similar function
in stimulating scientific advances. The evolution of systems with many
elements, those that advocates of intelligent design argue are irreducibly
155. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
157. See CRUMP, supra note 33, at 282.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 282-83.
162. Id.
163. Id.
complex, are the subject of intense inquiry today. The current effort to
explain the emergence of the bacterial flagellum may lead to new thinking
about natural selection itself, and evolutionary pathways for other complex
functions already have been proposed as a result of the irreducible
complexity critique. 164 "Exadaptation," or the development of a complex
organ by reason of a change in function from mutations to a simpler organ,
is one pathway that natural selection biologists have proposed in response to
intelligent design theory.'65 Furthermore, means of testing these new
theories are also the subject of inquiry. It seems likely that these efforts will
generate not only new theories to address the criticisms of irreducible
complexity advocates but also new means of subjecting new theories of
evolution to experimentation. 1
66
C. Better Examination of the Question- "What Is Science?"
Intelligent design involves a negative inference. It depends upon the
assertion that natural selection cannot explain phenomena exhibiting what
advocates call irreducible complexity. Thus, intelligent design is based on
reasoning that, if evolution through chance mutations is eliminated, an
intelligent design must have produced these phenomena. A definition of
science that depends exclusively upon falsification, such as Popper's
approach, might deem the second step-the inference of intelligent design-
unscientific. 67  At the same time, it should be remembered that a strict
falsificationist approach to demarcation of science also eliminates
paleontology from the ranks of sciences.
168
A different view, one that allowed science to depend upon inferences
from evidence rather than falsification by experiment, would reinstate
paleontology as a science. At the same time, such a verificationist approach
might recognize irreducible complexity as a scientific hypothesis because
advocates of irreducible complexity base their arguments upon evidence and
inferences from them. 169  Proof by negative inference, or reductio ad
absurdum, has been recognized since ancient times as a valid method of
deduction (although it remains debatable whether the method can correctly
164. See supra notes 7, 29-30 and accompanying text.
165. "Exadaptation" refers to a change in function of an existing organ: a change by which an
organ furnishing excretory outlets, for example, also furnishes crude locomotion that is improved
upon by further adaptation until the organ has become an instrument for locomotion rather than
excretion. It also is called "cooptation." See supra notes 7, 29 and accompanying text. Actually,
Darwin himself proposed the idea of the "transitions of organs" by "conversion from one function to
another." DARWIN, supra note 19, at 160.
166. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
167. See supra Part I.A.I.
168. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
169. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the verificationists' approach).
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be used here).170 Thus, while the rigorous falsificationist probably would
deny that irreducible complexity, along with paleontology, is scientific, a
more expanded definition of science might treat it as scientific. Studying
both theories (natural selection and irreducible complexity) may advance
understanding of the nature of science.
In fact, irreducible complexity and its corollary of purposeful design
provide an interesting example for considering different conceptions of
science. With different answers to the question-"What is science?"-one
can produce different answers to the question whether the irreducible
complexity critique of evolution is scientific. In other words, the
falsificationist, verificationist, and pragmatist views give us different
outcomes.
First, if the rigid falsification criterion is the exclusive method of
demarcating science from other kinds of logic, then it probably will force us
to label irreducible complexity as unscientific because it cannot be tested by
experiment. The closest we can come is to propose evolutionary pathways
for given organisms or systems and then attempt to falsify those pathways.
For example, we can propose that a particular bacterial flagellum developed
by exadaptation from a secretory organ, and we can attempt to "grow" a
similar flagellum in the laboratory by reproducing the conditions that we
imagine might have stimulated this exadaptation. 7 ' If we are able to do so,
we might conclude that irreducible complexity theory is falsified. If we are
unable to do so, it is not falsified-or so we might reason.
But there are serious problems with using this approach to test
irreducible complexity. First, we probably will not have simulated the
random means by which the particular flagellum developed, especially if we
create conditions that we already think will lead to precisely that
development. Second, there are many bacterial flagella and infinitely many
potential complex systems in all of the organisms on earth, and the discovery
of one or more pathways for one or more complex systems cannot falsify the
hypothesis that some of them may reflect complexity that is irreducible.
Third, our ability to grow a flagellum that resembles a particular natural
flagellum does not falsify the possibility that the natural flagellum is
irreducibly complex. It seems difficult, then, to conclude that either
irreducible complexity or intelligent design is falsifiable.
Second, there is the verificationist or inductionist approach. Here, our
criteria expand beyond falsification. We still insist that proponents of the
170. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (discussing reductio ad absurdum).
171. See supra notes 7, 29-30 and accompanying text.
irreducible complexity argument base their ideas on appropriate evidence
and use cognizable logic in reaching their conclusions, but falsifiability is
not the only qualifier. Under this definition of science, evolutionary
theorists who propose pathways for development of the bacterial flagellum
are scientists by reason of the kinds of inferences they make, irrespective of
whether their ideas are testable.
But what about irreducible complexity? Here is how the difference in
definition makes a difference in result. Arguably, the irreducible complexity
theorist-such as Michael Behe, the leading proponent of the flagellum
example' 7 2-is no less a scientist than the straight evolutionary theorist
under the verificationist criterion. This individual also uses evidence and
logic. Behe's principal argument-that the flagellum fits into "Darwin's
Black Box" because of its complexity-uses evidence and inference in much
the same way as the paleontologist's theories do.'73 It also relies on proof by
elimination, or the inference that evolutionary development of such a
complex mechanism is improbable. Although the evolutionist's theories do
not depend on this kind of negative inference, reductio ad absurdum is a
competent logical argument. 
174
As it happens, Behe's application of the logic is ultimately unconvincing
to me and to others because his reductio ad absurdum argument does not
take adequate account of exadaptation: the possibility that the combination
of disparate parts came together after a series of changes in function of pre-
existing organs, rather than appearing simultaneously. 175  Behe has
acknowledged the flaw, and at least one court has rejected Behe's claims as
unscientific on this ground. 176 This result seems a trifle harsh because we
cannot defrock every scientist who makes a miscalculation. 177 If science is
defined by a broad verificationist or inductivist methodology, then Behe's
development of the irreducible complexity hypothesis is science. It may not
be persuasive in light of the possibility of exadaptation, but that alone does
not make it unscientific.
Third, there is the view of the pragmatists. Their test of scientific truth
depends upon whether the theory helps an individual to solve a given
problem or form the basis of a decision to act.178 Irreducible complexity and
intelligent design seem to fail this test. Knowing that an organism is the
product of "design" and is "irreducibly complex" does not seem to help us
172. See supra notes 7, 29-30 and accompanying text.
173. See BEHE, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 165.
176. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 739 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
177. Cf supra note 119 (describing a major error made by Galileo, despite his many scientific
achievements).
178. See supra Part II.A.3.
[Vol. 36: 1, 2008] A Contrarian Approach to the Intelligent Design Debate
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
solve a problem or decide how to act with respect to the organism. In other
words, these conceptions probably cannot tell us at the theoretical level how
to predict this or that development, and they cannot point the way toward
preventing disease or enhancing the utility of foodstuffs at the concrete
level.
Understanding Darwinian evolution, on the other hand, does help solve
problems and indicate action. At the theoretical level, natural selection
theory tells us that bacteria will evolve forever. At the concrete level, it tells
us that we had better keep developing new antibiotics to kill bacteria that
adapt to the old ones.17 9 This analysis suggests that the pragmatists'
approach would indicate that evolution is a scientific construct-but that
irreducible complexity and intelligent design are not.
The point, however, is that this conclusion depends on which definition
of science we use in analyzing these theories. The pragmatist and
falsificationist might see irreducible complexity as unscientific, but the
verificationist might not. The further point is that defining science narrowly
brings about results that seem questionable. Finally, studying irreducible
complexity arguments provides an excellent vehicle for studying different
answers to the question--"What is science?" This, too, is a positive secular
purpose.
D. Generating the Ability to Argue Against Intelligent Design
Most efforts to teach natural selection include a rigorous effort to
eliminate teleological explanations. This effort is necessary because
teleological impressions are strong in many people and prevent an
understanding of the mechanism of natural selection unless they are
dispelled at the beginning. 80 But a dogmatic rejection of teleological
explanations, while inconsistent with acceptance of irreducible complexity
theory, will not help a student very much in deciding whether to accept or
reject intelligent design. It will serve even less to equip a student to argue
against the conclusions of an informed advocate of irreducible complexity.
For that, one needs to understand the arguments in favor of irreducible
complexity, as well as the contrary arguments of those who reject the theory.
Thus, one of the reasons that I advocate examination of irreducible
complexity, although I myself consider natural selection overwhelmingly to
179. Cf CRUMP, supra note 33, at 283 (discussing the emergence of vancomycin-resistant
pathogens).
180. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
be the more likely valid approach, involves an apparent paradox. I think it is
useful for students to study the arguments allegedly supporting irreducible
complexity so that they can understand the arguments that refute irreducible
complexity. In other words, they will have a basis for rejecting irreducible
complexity if they so decide.
E. Understanding What the Majority of the Population Believes, as a Basis
for Communicating and Negotiating With Others
The majority of American people believe that evolution is an erroneous
theory.' 8 ' The statement seems astounding, but at least one poll clearly
supports it.'" 2 This does not mean that all who reject evolution credit
irreducible complexity or even understand it, but there must be many in the
population who harbor teleological beliefs about the origin of species.
Communicators who do not understand the belief systems of those to
whom they aim their ideas are less likely to be successful. To put the matter
another way, a skillful person writing an advertisement, picking a jury,
negotiating with others, trying to analyze voters, or seeking to win an
election needs to understand the assumptions and attitudes of the
audience. 8 3 An understanding of irreducible complexity would provide a
sound comparison for the educated person of his or her own beliefs with the
incompatible beliefs of others.
In some endeavors, in fact, it is necessary to bracket one's own thoughts
and listen to the incompatible thoughts of others with whom one clearly
disagrees. Negotiation and active listening are such endeavors. 8 4 The blithe
condemnation of the teleological as wrong and the assertion of absolute
rightness in doing so, which often accompany the teaching of evolution,
send a dysfunctional message about these issues. Although it is not one of
the more important purposes for teaching irreducible complexity, this
concern for communicational abilities provides an additional, if lesser,
reason. In other words, teaching irreducible complexity might produce not
only better students of science but also better listeners and negotiators.
181. Wilson, supra note 31, at 31. "[H]alf of Americans recently polled (2004) not only do not
believe in evolution by natural selection but do not believe in evolution at all." Id.
182. Id.
183. See M. SCOTT PECK, THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED: A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF LOVE,
TRADITIONAL VALUES AND SPIRITUAL GROWTH 120-131 (1978) (explaining the difficulty and
importance of "the work of attention," i.e., active listening).
184. Cf CRUMP, supra note 33, at 520-23, 532-43 (discussing active listening and negotiation).
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F. Understanding the Inconclusiveness ofScientific Theory
Scientists need to retain a detached skepticism about the permanence
and universality of the theories that they accept. Surely Popper is right
about at least this aspect of his thinking. Theories that seem to have been
falsified may turn out later to require at least partial acceptance, and
conclusions that seem overwhelmingly corroborated may turn out to require
modification under different or special conditions, or even as general
principles.
Thus Lamarckian evolution, in spite of its thorough falsification, has
resurfaced in modem times as correct in at least one situation: genetic
modification, which leads to propagation of acquired characteristics through
the mechanism of altered genes. 18 5 Newtonian mechanics turn out to require
modification under extreme relativistic conditions, such as those that are to
be found in the vicinity of a black hole. 186 The cherished belief that the
speed of light is a constant is challenged today by some cosmologists who
propose a variable speed of light, which may have existed in the first instant
of the expanding universe.' 87 And during the writing of this article, an
astronomy student discovered a massive supernova designated "SN2006gy,"
240 million light-years away, that challenged basic scientific beliefs.' 88
SN2006gy is not merely a supernova-its explosion was a hundred times
bigger than any supemova seen before.' 89  Older models would have
suggested that SN2006gy was such a large star that it should have imploded
to become a black hole, but that result does not appear to have occurred. 190
Actually, we do not know because what we see is what happened 240
million years ago. What we do know is that SN2006gy will require
scientists to revise their theories about how stars live and die. "[T]his
supernova shows pretty clearly that our knowledge is incomplete," said J.
Craig Wheeler, an astronomer at the University of Texas.' 9' Although there
185. See JOHNSON & RAVEN, supra note 13, at 228-29 (explaining genetic engineering).
186. See CRUMP, supra note 33, at 314.
187. See JoAo MAGUEIJO, FASTER THAN THE SPEED OF LIGHT: THE STORY OF A SCIENTIFIC
SPECULATION 156-59 (2003) (postulating a varying speed of light during the first instant of the
universe, "in perfect contradiction to the fundamental principle underlying the conservation of
energy," as a consequence of mathematical results and the need to explain creation of matter).
188. See Chris Wilson, A Blast from the Past: A Huge Supernova Raises Questions About the
Early Universe, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 21, 2007, at 37.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
should not have been any need for Professor Wheeler's understatement, the
need is there, largely created by undue expectations of scientific knowledge.
Is it possible that we may learn of a place in biology for irreducible
complexity theory? It seems doubtful to me, but I cannot rule it out. In fact,
some thinking that favors intelligent design sees it as a kind of gap-filler.
Advocates of this view accept the strong evidence that appears to support
natural selection, but they argue that there are some phenomena that natural
selection cannot explain. Specifically, they posit the existence of irreducible
complexity, as it is illustrated by the bacterial flagellum.
19 2
Others reject the idea, and while recognizing that we cannot confidently
specify any particular mechanism for the emergence of the flagellum by
natural selection, they predict that one day we will know the answer.1 93 This
thinking seems dangerous to me. It resembles the arguments of
pseudoscientists who argued against the Copernican universe and who, in a
triumph of irrational faith over science, made arguments that supported the
censorship of Galileo's views. 194 In any event, encouraging a conscious
decision to keep an open mind about the irreducible complexity critique
would be consistent with most theories of the nature of science.
G. Avoiding Censorship: "Teacher, What Do You Think Happened Before
the Big Bang?"
One of the costs of our attitudes toward irreducible complexity is that
there is widespread censorship of legitimate inquiry as a result of it.'95 This
is particularly so with respect to so-called "ultimate" questions. What
happened before evolution even started? The question sometimes is put in
terms of the "ultimate origins" of species, as versus their "proximate"
origins. As Eugenie Scott puts it, "Although some people confuse the origin
of life itself with evolution, the two are conceptually separate .... Life had
to precede evolution! ... [But w]e know much more about evolution than
about the origin of life.' 19 6 And there are other ultimate questions, including
the one posed by the Dalai Lama: "Regardless of how persuasive the
Darwinian account of the origins of life may be, as a Buddhist, I find it
leaves one crucial area unexamined. This is the origin of sentience-the
evolution of conscious beings who have the capacity to experience pain and
pleasure."' 197 When did thinking and feeling organisms evolve? But perhaps
192. Michael Behe's views, for example, fit this description. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
193. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
195. See infra notes 200-07 and accompanying text.
196. EUGENE SCOTT, EVOLUTION VS. CREATIONISM: AN INTRODUCTION 27 (2004).
197. THE DALAI LAMA, THE UNIVERSE IN A SINGLE ATOM: THE CONVERGENCE OF SCIENCE AND
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the most inaccessible question of this kind involves the effort to account for
the universe before the instant of its expansion in the Big Bang. The
possibility of an oscillating or bouncing universe-one that expands from an
infinitesimally small point to the enormous cosmos that we think of today,
and then, possibly through the influence of gravity, compresses again to a
point, only to explode again-is one theory.'98 But then, what started the
oscillations?
These questions require at least an ingredient of speculation. Indeed,
speculation is a part of the process of science. Students in public school
biology courses may want to ask questions about these issues, but
Establishment Clause concerns make it difficult to discuss possible answers.
For example, a student may ask, "Teacher, what happened before the Big
Bang, or if there is an oscillating universe, what put it into motion?" The
result will probably be an awkward announcement that the question is out of
bounds. Even more embarrassment arises, of course, if the student asks,
"Where does God come into all of this?" The result is quite likely to include
a suggestion that the very thought is impertinent. But imagine that the
teacher dignifies the question by inviting discussion. Then, the controversy
really begins.
The speculation that leads to possible answers to such a question may
involve creation ex nihilo (out of nothing), creation out of chaos, or creation
from a situation in which there was not even any "nothing" present. Each of
these possibilities finds theological support in the creation myths of one or
more of the major world religions.' 99 The problem is that courts have held
that consistency of answers with such myths-rightly or wrongly-is
indicative of unconstitutionality. 200 A student may ask, "Why can't we make
protoplasm that 'works' in the laboratory?" Almost any answer creates a
similar danger. Even the Dover School District, which dared to introduce
intelligent design into its curriculum, was fearful of letting students discuss
these questions in school. 20 1  "The school leaves the discussion of the
Origins of Life to individuals and their families," said its policy. 202 This is
SPIRITUALITY 115 (2005).
198. See MAGUEIJO, supra note 187, at 106-07 (explaining the "bouncing" (or "oscillating")
universe theory).
199. See GRIFFIN, supra note 1, at 563-67 (summarizing creation stories from various religions).
200. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578 (1987), which considered similarities between a school board's policy and Judeo-Christian
creation stories); see also GRIFFIN, supra note 1, at 585 (reproducing testimony relied upon by
another court in similar ruling).
201. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 709 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
202. Id.
unfortunate because scientific inquiry into origin-of-life questions might be
valuable, and ruling the questions out-of-bounds in school is likely to
discourage inquiry.
The result is a broader censorship-a banning of perfectly proper
discussion. Why? Because constitutional law is not practiced with a
scalpel. Instead, it is practiced with a chainsaw. It is broad, vague, and
scary to a school district safeguarding public money, especially when backed
up by expensive litigation that may be doubly expensive because attorney's
fees are recoverable and may create crushing personal liability for
individuals. It is difficult to handle a chainsaw legal principle in this
environment so that it lops off only that which is unconstitutional without
censoring protected speech. Although I do not know that the precise
examples given above have created controversy, efforts to answer similar
questions have led to litigation and therefore censorship.
Recently, a prospective high school teacher in California offered to
teach an elective philosophy course-not a course on science or theology,
but an elective course in philosophy, open to those who wanted it-called
the "Philosophy of Intelligent Design. 20 3  Local parents sued, and the
teacher changed the name to "The Philosophy of Design, 2 °4 apparently
hoping that critics would appreciate the elimination of "Intelligent." Facing
enormous attorney's fees claims as well as complaints, the school district
ultimately cancelled the class. 20 5  The plaintiffs' attorney exulted, "This
sends a strong signal to school districts across the country that they cannot
promote . . . intelligent design, whether they do so in a science class or a
humanities class. 20 6
Well, yes, it does-but is that a good thing? The possibilities for similar
kinds of "peripheral censorship," as it might be called, are infinite. For
example, Leslie Griffin asks whether certain aspects of brain development or
comparative religion can properly be taught anywhere in a public school and
in such a censored environment:
A public school teacher, following Darwin's ideas and relying
on modern developments in neuroscience, added a section on
neuroscience to her biology class. According to class readings, "the
experience of God can be explained as nothing more than the effect
of a particular state of brain organization" and the "Golden
203. See Laurie Goodstein, California Parents File Suit Over Origins of Life Course, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2006, at A18.
204. Id.
205. See School District Pulls ID Course After Suit, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Feb. 7, 2006, at 14,
cited in GRIFFIN, supra note 1, at 617-18.
206. See Juliana Barbassa, School Board Drops Philosophy Class in Intelligent Design, HOUSTON
CHRON., Jan, 18, 2006, at A5.
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Rule ... is a product not of divine decree but of evolved instinct."
The students learn that religious sensations arise from the areas of
the brain that are specialized for religious emotion and thought.
Does the teacher violate the free exercise rights of her religious
students [or, for that matter, does she create an establishment of
(anti-)religion] by teaching the neuroscience segment of the course?
May the teacher include in the course readings from neurotheology,
a discipline that claims that "the human brain itself is revelatory of
information about God," because God hardwired our brains to seek
meaning? May the state legislature require the teacher to teach
neurotheology in her course?
Some writers argue that religions themselves undergo an
evolutionary process of "supernatural selection": "The religious
movements that have survived over the years tend to be the ones
that promote health, mate selection, and security." Where would
you teach that thesis-in a science course, a religious studies
course, a theology course, an economics of religion course, or not at
all?,, 2
07
The plaintiffs attorney in the "Philosophy of Design" case has helped
create an environment in which the answer is, "not at all." This kind of
censorship is fundamentally inconsistent with the inquisitive speculation that
is an essential part of both science and the humanities.
H. Teaching Epistemology Through Debate Among Inconsistent Theories
That Cannot be Readily Reconciled
There are great questions that serve well to provide the basis of debate
among conclusions whose inconsistencies cannot be definitively resolved.
The causes of the fall of the Roman Empire furnish a question that
traditionally has been offered as a basis for such debate.20t The question
whether natural selection furnishes a complete explanation of the origin of
species or whether it requires supplementation by reference to irreducible
complexity could become another-if it were allowed.
This question might provide a superior basis for the debate. Inquiry into
the causes of the fall of the Roman Empire furnishes a magnificent question
207. GRIFFIN, supra note 1, at 618 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted).
208. See Jay Tolson, Lessons from the Fall, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 7, 2007, at 28
(reporting on one historian's tally of 210 different explanations for the fall of Rome, as well as on
the continuing American fascination with the question).
for the purpose, but it requires that the debaters know not only a great deal
of history that is inaccessible to many people but also the methods of
history. The natural-selection-versus-intelligent-design question, on the
other hand, furnishes a basis for debate that is both inconclusive and
amenable to some evidence that is readily at hand, even if sophisticated
arguments require more depth. Legal arguments involve similar kinds of
debate, and it seems likely that students who have been educated through
this method would acquire skills that would serve them well in making or
evaluating arguments about the law.
I. Teleology and Deontology
Finally, understanding the difference between teleology, which is
illustrated by irreducible complexity theory, and deontology, which is
analogous to natural selection, may help students to understand other
philosophical questions. To see how, we must explore the fundamental
ideas of ethical philosophy. This digression (and admittedly, it will create a
long digression) will lead to what I contend is yet another secular purpose
served by teaching irreducible complexity.
1. Teleology, Deontology, and Moral Concepts: There is a Great
Divide in Ethical Philosophy Between Teleology and Deontology
Teleology is the philosophy that phenomena are not merely guided by
mechanical forces but that they are purposive and move toward goals of
improvement or self-actualization. 20 9 The most influential ethical thinkers in
this realm are probably the great utilitarians, Jeremy Bentham and John
Stuart Mill. The simplest statement of their philosophy is captured in
Bentham's claim that "[t]he greatest happiness of the greatest number.., is
the measure of right and wrong," although there have been more
sophisticated statements of the concept. 210 Deontology, on the other hand,
describes an opposing class of philosophies that refuse to total costs and
benefits from results.21' The great philosopher here is Immanuel Kant, who
denounced utilitarianism and set up an ethical system featuring "categorical
imperatives": actions that could be imitated as "universal laws," never to be
violated.2 12 Thus, utilitarianism emphasizes "good" or "happiness," whereas
Kantianism emphasizes "right" or "justice." There are other moral
philosophies that do not conform to these descriptions, but these two types
are dominant.
209. See CRUMP, supra note 33, at 209-10.
210. Id.at210-11.
211. Id. at 211-12.
212. Id.
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Both philosophies are incomplete, however, in the sense that neither can
explain a full range of moral choices in a manner that is satisfactory to
modem thinking. Utilitarianism is "aggregative," meaning that it judges the
morality of an action by totaling its results upon the happiness of all, even if
the results are unequal, and even if some in the minority are made much less
happy.213  Kantian thinking, on the other hand, derives an "anti-
objectification principle" as a categorical imperative: the notion that every
human being has intrinsic worth and that it is never permissible for any
human being to treat another solely as an object. 21 4 Thus, utilitarianism
tends to justify the oppression of persons who already are oppressed. It even
can be used to support slavery on the theory that unhappiness of some
persons is moral if it leads to happiness in others so that the total of
happiness increases.215 The anti-objectification principle in Kantianism, of
course, would firmly oppose this result.
But Kantianism is itself incomplete. Because it refuses to balance costs
and benefits and instead depends upon nonnegotiable categorical
imperatives, it drives moral decisions toward results that provide tiny
benefits for some at great cost to others. Because keeping a promise is a
categorical imperative, efficient breach is immoral, and a firm must keep its
contract and bankrupt itself even for negligible benefit to the other
contracting party.2 16 Furthermore, Kant never told us what to do if two
categorical imperatives conflict, as they tend to do for the hardest moral
questions. Thus, if one has made a promise that turns out to be illegal, one
must keep the promise and also obey the law because both actions are
categorical imperatives. But it is impossible to do both if the two actions
conflict. In this situation, the actor is left to "intuitionism," or idiosyncratic
preference.1 7 Utilitarianism avoids both of these traps by mandating the
moral choice that does the least damage and preserves the greatest sum of
happiness.
Thus, whether most people know it or not, they sometimes think in
teleological moral terms and sometimes in deontological terms. The trick to
leading a moral life, then, becomes a matter of knowing when to follow
teleological thinking-and when to use deontology instead. Moral
philosophers have proposed various tests to address this question, although
213. Id. at 211.
214. Id. at 212.
215. Id. at 213.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 213-14.
most of them contain major ingredients of intuitionism. 218  For example,
Professor Heidi Hurd suggests that most questions should be resolved
teleologically, by the utilitarian calculus, and that deontological thinking
should be reserved for "patrol[ling] the borders" of moral choice.2t 9 In other
words, one should think deontologically when utilitarianism leads to results
that are offensive or "cross the line." In some areas of life, however, people
may tend to be dominated by "right-wrong" thinking when they probably
should consider the utilitarian balance.
2. From Moral Theories to Irreducible Complexity (or Vice Versa):
How are These Questions of Moral Philosophy Relevant to the
Study of Irreducible Complexity Theory?
There is an analogy between the divide that separates teleology and
deontology in moral thinking and the related, but different, divide between
philosophies in the natural world, i.e., science. In natural philosophy,
teleology is the belief that there is evidence of design and purpose in
nature. With a difference that is subtle but important, teleology also can
refer to the doctrine that final causes exist-for example, for the origins of
the universe or for the presence of humankind. Irreducible complexity, of
course, is a type of teleological philosophy. The evolutionist view, on the
other hand, emphasizes natural selection. To understand natural selection,
one must rigorously stamp out all vestiges of teleological thinking.
2 2 1
The point is that it probably would be more practical to teach and learn
the moral meanings of teleology and deontology if popular educations
included the irreducible complexity critique of natural selection. Perhaps, in
ages past when biology was taught differently, the philosophies of the
utilitarians and the Kantians were better understood among educated people.
Today, we have arguably improved our teaching of science but not of the
methods of moral philosophy. Educated people do not necessarily
understand these concepts, perhaps because their educations do not provide
sufficient exposure to them. An interesting example is furnished by the way
in which criminal justice courses in law schools cover the purposes or
reasons for crime definition and sentencing. Some casebooks point out that
three of the traditionally recognized factors-deterrence, incapacitation, and
reform-are utilitarian, whereas the final factor, retributive justice, is
deontological; but few casebooks supply any background about these
218. Id. at 220-22.
219. Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 254 (1996).
220. See CRUMP, supra note 33, at 281.
221. See supra Part IID.
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philosophies.222 To the extent that the casebooks do so, they cannot hope to
connect these ideas to a widely shared background of understanding among
students. The description comes off as a pair of labels, instead of as a
philosophical framework that explains to students why they should consider
both types of factors.
It should immediately be added that moral philosophy could be taught
separately from biology, without the introduction of any idea contrary to
natural selection in science classes. But I believe that the concepts would be
better understood if the irreducible complexity critique were introduced and
if the science class did not consist so one-sidedly of denunciations of all that
is teleological. Therefore, I see better understanding of the great divide in
moral philosophy as an additional secular purpose for considering intelligent
design. I do not consider it the most important purpose because I see the
development of science and its better understanding as more important, but
it would furnish an added bonus.
IV. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOCTRINE: A BRIEF REVIEW
The discussion above of secular purposes is important as a policy
debate, but it is more than that. It also proposes possible answers to one
aspect of the constitutional question, which depends upon whether a policy
of teaching intelligent design serves a secular purpose. But the answer to the
constitutional question requires other inquiries as well. Therefore, the next
step is to examine the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause doctrines.
A. The Lemon Test, Its Inconsistent Development, and the Resulting Cross-
Currents
The first systematic framework for analyzing Establishment Clause
claims was provided by Lemon v. Kurtzman.223 The familiar Lemon test has
three ingredients, requiring that a governmental action impinging upon
religion (1) serve a "secular purpose," for which any non-religious purpose
will do, with one such purpose being enough (the "purpose" prong); (2)
avoid "primary effects" that either "advance" or "inhibit" religion (the
"effects" prong); and (3) avoid any "excessive entanglement" with religion
222. See, e.g., RONALD BOYCE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 981-86 (10th ed. 2007)
(containing a court opinion that applies the four factors, but with no surrounding material explaining
the basis of utilitarian or Kantian philosophies).
223. 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see also Buckles, supra note 1, at 548-57 (discussing the constitutional
authorities).
(the "entanglement" prong).224 The Lemon test has the advantage of
generality, and it seems to be based upon relevant issues. Its disadvantage is
that it dissolves too easily into indeterminacy. Avoiding "effects" is difficult
in a constitutional regime in which neither advancement nor inhibition is
tolerable. Therefore, the real question becomes the following: How much
and what kind of effect for or against religion is acceptable?225 As for the
entanglement prong, it begs the question by expressing the limit in terms of
a prohibition upon "excessive" entanglement. 6
Unfortunately, the rest of Establishment Clause doctrine is a system of
cross-currents. There is a group of principles, some accepted by some
justices and others accepted by other justices, that complete or substitute for
the second and third prongs of the Lemon test. One approach is to expand
the prohibition to cover any governmental action that "endorses" religion. 227
At its logical extreme, this view would prevent government from engaging
in any action that might mention or depict religious ideas as acceptable. An
opposing approach is to narrow the prohibition to government action that
"proselytizes"22 8 or, as a narrower alternative, "coerces.,, 229 The extreme of
this approach would confine the Establishment Clause so that it would affect
government conduct only if it overtly attempted to recruit citizens to religion
(or alternatively, if it penalized them for refusing to accept it).
Then, there are the "accommodation" doctrines. These are of several
kinds. In the first place, there must be accommodation of religion when the
finding of an Establishment Clause violation would produce a violation of
the Free Exercise Clause, which after all is part of the same Constitution.
The "wall of separation" metaphor, although picturesque, is not very useful
because there are many circumstances in which government must be
involved with religion to ensure free exercise or avoid discrimination against
religion.23' As Justice Douglas pointed out, otherwise a police officer could
224. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
225. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 396 (1983) (labeling this the "more
difficult.. . question" and holding, but only by a 5-4 majority, that tax credits for tuition, textbooks,
and transportation are constitutional even though they assist parochial education, partly on the
grounds that "numerous private choices" are involved in the obtaining of funding, which also goes to
secular schools).
226. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 591 (1988) (upholding, again by a 5-4 majority,
government grants to religiously affiliated organizations to discourage premarital sex and pregnancy
despite "specific incidents of impermissible behavior by grantees").
227. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989) (plurality opinion).
228. See, e.g., id. at 659-663 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
229. See, e.g., Lee v. Weismann, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530
U.S. 290 (2000).
230. See Sch. Dist. v. Schlempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-299 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
231. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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not guide traffic to and from a church, synagogue, or mosque.232 Likewise,
Justice Brennan observed that we otherwise would have to send soldiers to
foreign wars without providing them with chaplains. 33 Second, there are
symbols or communications whose historically religious origins are
sufficiently remote so that readers are unlikely to see them as establishments
of religion. The legend on our coins and bills, "In God we trust," has been
given as an example.234 Third, certain ceremonies that are religious in
content can be accommodated in some places on the grounds that they are
"traditional," such as prayers at the beginnings of legislative activities.235
Fourth, seasonal observances, such as Christmas or Hanukkah displays, can
be accommodated under certain circumstances. These displays are more
likely to be permissible if they contain symbols from multiple religions. 36
Displays that include secular symbols as well as religious ones, such as those
that include Disney characters along with creches, also have an advantage in
passing the test.237 This last concept sometimes is pejoratively referred to as
the "reindeer rule" on the theory that inclusion of a reindeer among religious
symbols will sanitize an otherwise offensive religious display.238
This is a deliberately brief outline of a collection of conflicting doctrines
that were developed by several other commentators and that often produce
unpredictable results. In the context of the arguments about irreducible
complexity, however, there is one further case that needs particular mention.
B. Edwards v. Aguillard and the Invalidation of Louisiana's Creationism
Act
In Edwards v. Aguillard,239 the Supreme Court invalidated Louisiana's
Creationism Act. "Creation science" superficially resembled irreducible
complexity theory because it also proposed examples of biological
mechanisms that natural selection assertedly could not have produced. 240 It
differed in that some of its proponents, unlike scientists who promote
232. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
233. Schlempp, 374 U.S. at 296-99 (Brennan, J., concurring).
234. Id. at 303.
235. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983).
236. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
237. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
238. See DAVID CRUMPET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1129 (4th ed.
2002).
239. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
240. Id. at 591.
theories of irreducible complexity, relied upon transparently religious
elements.24' There was a version that explained the diversity of flora and
fauna in part by references to catastrophism as exemplified by a world-wide
flood 242-arguably, an allusion to the event that floated Noah's Ark. The
Louisiana statute required the teaching of creation science whenever natural
selection was taught, although it did not require the teaching of either.243 It
also provided certain protections and resources to teachers of creation
science that it did not extend to teachers of evolution.244 The stated purpose
of the Act was to "protect academic freedom," and the implied purpose of
the Act, at least as argued by Louisiana, was to advance "basic concepts of
fairness" by "teaching all of the evidence. 245
The Court, through Justice Brennan, concluded that the Creationism Act
did not further its stated secular purposes.246 Academic freedom usually is
thought of as protecting choices by individual teachers, but this statute
actually narrowed the available modes of teaching. 247 According to the
Court, the statute also did not advance the goal of teaching all of the
evidence because it provided incentives to the teaching of creation science
that it did not provide to the teaching ofevolution.24' A law actually aimed
at this asserted goal, said the Court, would encourage the teaching of "all
scientific theories about the origins of humankind.
249
Furthermore, in addition to failing the "purpose" prong, the Creationism
Act failed the "effects" prong because it endorsed the religious belief that a
supernatural being had created the universe. The legislative history
convinced the Court that the term "creation science" was chosen to further
precisely this goal.2 5 0 Even worse, the Act was designed to prefer certain
religious beliefs over others and to denigrate the teaching of a scientific
theory that some religious sects disfavored but others did not.25' The Court
noted that the record included "uncontroverted affidavits" from scientists
and others to the effect that "origin through abrupt appearance in complex
form" was a true scientific theory; however, none of these affiants had
contributed to the enactment of the law, and their opinions did not persuade
the Court about either the meaning of the Act or its alleged secular
241. Id.
242. Id. at 600 (Powell, J., concurring).
243. Id. at 581 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.4A (1982)).
244. Id. at 588 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.7B (1982)).
245. Id. at 586.
246. Id. at 596.
247. Id. at 587.
248. Id. at 588.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 591-92.
251. Id. at 592-93.
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purposes. 52 Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented on
the ground that the case should be resolved after full consideration of the
evidence, rather than by summary judgment.2 13
Edwards can be read to outlaw intelligent design, but it can also be
distinguished. Intelligent design connotes the suggestion of a purposeful
mechanism that can be read as paralleling the implication of a "Creator" in
creation science,254 although the theory does not depend upon a "designer,"
and although the suggestion from irreducible complexity is less necessarily
religious. 5 Also, some of the groups most forcefully supporting irreducible
complexity and intelligent design are, once again, those with certain
religious viewpoints. 6  Furthermore, the Court's mention of the
endorsement test in Edwards257 may have facilitated its holding of
unconstitutionality, and it presumably would cut in favor of the same result
in an irreducible complexity case more than other tests might.
But on the other hand, the Edwards court did not consider the multiple
secular purposes discussed above, which can be said to support the
consideration of irreducible complexity theory. Instead, the Court narrowed
its reading of the Creationism Act's possible secular purposes to those it
inferred from legislative history-not the secular purposes that the Act could
validly be said to advance, but only those that the legislature identified.25 8 A
law expressly founded on other, more achievable secular purposes might
have a better chance of constitutional survival. Furthermore, if the Court
were to apply a less restrictive test than the endorsement test, such as either
the coercion or the proselytization approach,2 59 it might reach a different
result in its evaluation of the effects and entanglement prongs. Irreducible
complexity theory is less easily viewed as focused upon a "Creator" than is
creation science. Some scientists who promote irreducible complexity do
not necessarily reject evolution, but rather see a case to be made for both
theories.26 °
One also can consider the accommodation doctrines as supporting
intelligent design on the basis of themes in these opinions that prefer
252. Id. at 595-96.
253. Id. at 610-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
254. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
255. See infra Part V.C.2.
256. See infra Part V.C.1.
257. 482 U.S. at 593.
258. See supra notes 246-52 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
government conduct that does not favor any identifiable religion or that
pluralistically includes more than one major religion.261 Intelligent design
need not depend on any religious basis at all, although it fits comfortably
with a wide variety of major world religions that propose a purposeful force
behind the origin of species.262 And finally, the Court's reference to
teaching "all scientific theories about the origins of humankind ' 263 arguably
permits the introduction of irreducible complexity-unless, that is, this
theory cannot claim to be "scientific."
V. IRREDUCIBLE COMPLEXITY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The key question in this area is often proposed by asking whether the
introduction of irreducible complexity theory threatens values that are
protected by the Establishment Clause. I would turn this question on its
head by arguing that some approaches to natural selection can go too far and
cause the inculcation of the theory to threaten values protected by the
Establishment Clause, and I would ask whether it is possible that the
introduction of irreducible complexity theory, as a critique, might reduce the
threat to Establishment Clause values.
A. Can We Reduce the Tendency Toward an Establishment of Religion by
Introducing Irreducible Complexity as a Critique of Natural Selection?
The teaching of natural selection requires such rigorous elimination of
teleological thinking that it is not too much to assert that it puts the rejection
of that thinking on the level of dogma.2 4  Meanwhile, however, the
possibility of a grand design that coincides with evolutionary observations
cannot be eliminated by experiment or observation. A scientist can conclude
that data have been collected that are consistent with an evolutionary
hypothesis, but this is not the same as demonstrating that the data are
inconsistent with a purposive force. Indeed, the adamant choice against
teleology that accompanies the introduction of natural selection can be seen
as exactly that-a choice. At the least, this is correct if the rejection of
teleology is presented as a given, without debate, and without the
development of the obvious contrary theory or its refutation.
The possibility exists, then, that the teaching of evolutionary theory can
go farther than scientific inquiry and present itself as an alternative to
religious doctrine. In fact, some scientists have suggested the deliberate
substitution of natural selection for religion. Edward 0. Wilson, the
261. See supra notes 230-37 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 199-200; infra Part V.C.2.
263. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 588 (1987).
264. See supra Part I.D.
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Pellegrino University Professor Emeritus at Harvard, is a scholarly giant in
the fields of biodiversity and sociobiology. He treats the "scientific
humanism" inherent in natural selection as an alternative to other religions-
or, more accurately, as a religion itself:
So, will science and religion find common ground, or at least agree
to divide the fundamentals into mutually exclusive domains? A
great many well-meaning scholars believe that such rapprochement
is both possible and desirable. A few disagree, and I am one of
them .... Rapprochement may be neither possible nor desirable.
There is something deep in religious belief that divides people and
amplifies societal conflict. In the early part of this century, the
toxic mix of religion and tribalism has become so dangerous as to
justify taking seriously the alternative view, that humanism based
on science is the effective antidote, the light and the way at last
placed before US.
265
Professor Wilson follows this vision of scientific humanism (as "the
light and way at last placed before us") and his recognition of the
"dangerous" effects of "religion and tribalism" with some unusual
arguments-unusual, that is, as reasons for accepting either science or
faith.266  Religion, he admits, has some positive effects.267  It "has
generated... the ideals of altruism and public service," and it has "inspired
the arts. 268 Moreover, "[c]reation myths were in a sense the beginning of
science itself. '269 But on the negative side, Professor Wilson points out that
religion has created "bigotry and the dehumanization of infidels. '270 He then
asks, "Can scientific humanism do as well or better [than theistic religions],
at a lower cost? '271 This has got to be the ultimate in pragmatism: we should
replace theistic religions with Wilson's belief in secular humanism because
he believes the change will result in a more positive social order! And
Wilson is only one of many scientists who seek to persuade everyone to shed
theistic religions and adopt atheism, agnosticism, or humanism. 27 2 It is no
265. Wilson, supra note 31, at 33.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See Jay Tolson, The New Unbelievers: Books on Atheism Are Hot. But Do They Have
longer possible to pretend, as the Supreme Court sometimes has,27 3 that we
do not inculcate secular humanism if we engage in a dogmatic denunciation
of all that is teleological. The scientists' beliefs, and their efforts to
proselytize people to them, are scientific, but they also are a religion.
The insistence upon non-teleological thought that is the basis of
teaching natural selection implicitly eliminates the recognition of purposive
forces behind the universe. It therefore could be taken as inconsistent with
religious thought, which is inherently teleological. Professor Wilson
reminds us that many scientists believe that rapprochement of science and
religion is both possible and desirable.274 But Professor Wilson's arguments
take the issue into another realm altogether. "[S]cientific humanism," he
writes, is "the only world-view compatible with science's growing
knowledge of the real world and the laws of nature. 2 75 According to this
view, natural selection is itself a religion, and on policy grounds, Professor
Wilson suggests that it is quite possibly a healthier body of doctrine for
human beings to accept. One senses, however, that Professor Wilson would
not censor inquiry into the arguments underlying irreducible complexity
because he advocates "[t]he shedding of blind faith [and the adoption of]
intellectual fearlessness" that led Charles Darwin "to explore human
evolution wherever logic and evidence took him., 276 These are thoughtful
views, if iconoclastic.
Therefore, the rejection of teleology that often underlies the teaching of
natural selection is troublesome if presented as a premise to be accepted
without examination. Its counterpart is irreducible complexity, which
furnishes an alternative premise. Without any examination of this
alternative, the teaching of natural selection too easily becomes a matter of
faith.2 77  In Professor Wilson's view, and probably that of many others,
natural selection may be a preferable substitute for religion. The formation
of this belief is fine if it comes about in an individual independently of
government inculcation.278  But a government that teaches evolution by
dogmatic insistence upon a non-purposive philosophy comes closer to an
Anything Fresh to Say?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 13, 2006, at 40 (reporting that "books on
atheism are hot"); David van Biema, God vs. Science, TIME, Nov. 13, 2006, at 48 (describing
numerous books by scientists debunking God and calling for scientific substitutes).
273. The Supreme Court's treatment of this issue has been summary. "We agree.., that the state
may not establish a 'religion of secularism' .... We do not agree, however, that this decision in any
sense has that effect." Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963). This
approach is not viable today, given the views of many teachers like Wilson-assuming it ever was
viable.
274. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
275. Wilson, supra note 31, at 33.
276. Id.
277. See supra Part 11.B.
278. See Wilson, supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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establishment of religion than if it had recognized that there can be
teleological explanations of the same phenomena. Furthermore, students can
be left to infer this possibility if they are made aware of the irreducible
complexity critique.
B. Applying Establishment Clause Criteria: Is It Lawful to Consider
Irreducible Complexity?
As is the case in many Establishment Clause cases, the lawfulness of
considering irreducible complexity in public schools depends not only on
how the subject is presented and the context but which approach to the law
is chosen. In other words, it depends upon which Supreme Court Justice the
decisionmaker listens to.279 Some approaches make the idea seem entirely
likely to be constitutional, at least if it is presented without overt religious
content, while others make that conclusion appear doubtful.
The Lemon test requires the application of three criteria: the purpose
prong, the effects prong, and the entanglement prong.280 The catalogue of
secular purposes provided above addresses the purpose prong. Edwards v.
Aguillard, which held Louisiana's Creationism Act unconstitutional for lack
of any secular purpose, seems distinguishable because the theory of
irreducible complexity, unlike Louisiana's Creationism Act, deals with
subjects that current science cannot explain and has already spurred the
development of new theories of natural selection.28'
The effects prong and the entanglement prong, however, more often
form the basis of constitutional decision. These criteria depend upon the
overlay of interpretive theory that is chosen to test these issues. If a
proselytization or a coercion approach is the true test, and if irreducible
complexity is presented without overt content attributable to any particular
religion, teaching irreducible complexity theory appears likely to be
constitutional because presentation of the idea as a criticism of natural
selection does not coerce or proselytize.
282
If, on the other hand, an endorsement test 283 is thought to be the proper
approach, the constitutionality of teaching irreducible complexity becomes
more difficult to evaluate. On the one hand, irreducible complexity invites
the conclusion that intelligent design is a factor in the origin of species-
279. See supra Part IV.
280. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
281. See supra notes 7, 29 and accompanying text.
282. Cf supra Part IV (discussing prosetylization and coercion approaches).
283. Cf supra Part IV (discussing the endorsement test).
perhaps even requiring that conclusion. Then the effect is to suggest the
action of a creative force underlying the universe. If this is enough to make
out an endorsement of religion, then it can be argued that irreducible
complexity cannot be raised as a theory without violating the Establishment
Clause. On the other hand, teaching natural selection is constitutional in
spite of its implicit endorsement of quasi-religious thinking in some people.
If Professor Wilson is correct, and "scientific humanism" supplies the true
"light and the way," the teaching of natural selection with an anti-
teleological message presented as undisputed and unexamined fact leads to a
religious effect just as surely as irreducible complexity does.284 In fact, one
can argue that the presentation of an alternative to that theory, such as
irreducible complexity, would make the teaching of biology come closer to
neutrality, in which government neither advances nor inhibits religion.
285 iFinally, there is the entanglement prong, which is subject to an
analysis similar to that applied to the effects prong. Teaching irreducible
complexity might require that the generation of books, lesson plans, or other
materials be scrutinized to ensure that they do not contain explicitly religious
content. Teachers of various religious or non-religious persuasions would
need to be prevented from using irreducible complexity as an introduction to
the Book of Genesis. On the other hand, the same concerns should apply
today to the teaching of natural selection. Textbooks arguably should be
scrutinized so that they avoid the suggestion that Professor Wilson sees as
implicit in Darwinism: that scientific humanism is both logically compelled
and preferable to any religion. Teachers presumably should be chosen and
supervised so that they do not use evolutionary theory to denounce religion.
The trouble is that the justification of this anti-religious bias is as easy to
infer from natural selection theory, as Professor Wilson demonstrates, 286 as
pro-religious bias is to infer from irreducible complexity. Viewed in this
way, irreducible complexity does not produce an excessive entanglement
with religion, and it arguably reduces that entanglement.
Then, too, one can consider accommodation doctrines as support for the
teaching of irreducible complexity theory. In particular, the accommodation
cases indicate that the presentation of ideas with religious suggestion can be
constitutional if they are surrounded by, or presented in the context of,
secular symbols. 287 The accommodation cases also illustrate that the Court
is more likely to approve displays containing religious suggestion if multiple
religions are included.288 The introduction of irreducible complexity as a
284. Wilson, supra note 31, at 33.
285. Cf supra Part IV (discussing the entanglement prong).
286. See supra notes 265-71 and accompanying text.
287. See supra Part IV (discussing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)).
288. See supra Part IV (discussing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)).
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criticism of natural selection fits this description. I do not think the theory
contains religious thought any more so than natural selection does, but even
if it is thought of as quasi-religious, accommodation doctrine argues against
the presentation of only the opposing view of natural selection. Discussion
of irreducible complexity does not advance any particular religion, and in
this regard, its introduction along with natural selection resembles the effect
achieved by pluralistic Christmas displays or cross-and-menorah depictions.
The "religious" suggestion, if any, is more a message of tolerance than an
endorsement or proselytization.
C. To What Extent Is the Debate Dependent Upon Mere Labels-or Upon
the Private Beliefs of Supporters?
1. The Potential Disenfranchisement of Religious People Who Make
Secular Contributions
One Establishment Clause approach that has figured heavily in
intelligent design cases is that the private religious beliefs or intentions of
supporters of legislation ought to indicate unconstitutionality. Holdings
striking down either creationism or intelligent design initiatives tend to offer,
as purported support, the religious orientation of those who have lobbied for
the teaching of these theories. For example, in McLean v. Arkansas Board
of Education, the trial judge's opinion struck down an Arkansas statute
partly on the ground that creationists were "inspired" by the story of the
Creation in Genesis, and it dwelled heavily on the religiously oriented
"views on the nature of creation science" held by Paul Ellwanger, who had
formed a group supporting the teaching of this theory.289 In Kitzmiller v.
Dover Area School District, which invalidated a local school board
resolution providing for the introduction of intelligent design into the
curriculum, the trial judge emphasized the religious beliefs of Phillip
Johnson, identified as the "father" of intelligent design, and of Professor
Michael Behe, a theoretical biologist who has argued that natural selection
cannot explain all phenomena without the addition of a theory of purposeful
arrangements. 290 The judge also condemned the writings of The Discovery
Institute for Renewal of Science and Culture on the ground that they
"reveal[ed] cultural and religious goals" and not merely "scientific ones." 291
289. 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1261-63 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
290. 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 719-21 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
291. Id. at 720.
In an as-applied challenge, these items of evidence might be relevant.
They should not have carried more than tangential weight, however, in a suit
involving the facial invalidation of a state statute, as in McLean, or an entire
school board policy, as in Kitzmiller. The fact is that many religious people
have advanced the cause of science, as well as promoted other secular
purposes, because they were inspired by religious belief. Pascal illustrated
probability theory by his famous "Pascal's Wager": because the value of
heaven was infinite, even if its probability seemed small, logic compelled
the living of a life consistent with its existence. Newton derived his
mechanics, which are among the greatest achievements in physics, without
experiment and with a firm grounding in his own religious beliefs.2 93 These
advancements should be viewed on their own terms, and not with reference
to the religious philosophy of the inventors who developed them.
Nor should this principle be confined to the scientific realm. Imagine
that a deeply religious philanthropist donates a hospital to a local
government, stating publicly that he is doing so "for the greater glory of
God." The reasoning in McLean and Kitzmiller suggests that the
government might be forced to disclaim this gift on Establishment Clause
grounds. That outcome is improbable; in fact, even if the mayor were to
announce the donor's religious motivations publicly at a dedication
ceremony, it seems odd to suggest that this hospital donation is
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the
argument that the Ten Commandments are a major precursor to modem
moral sentiments underlying theories of government.294 The religious
origins of our penal codes, however, do not mean that they are
unconstitutional. These portions of court opinions analyzing creationism
and intelligent design cases represent sloppy thinking, and they pose a
danger of disenfranchising religious people who make secular contributions.
2. Is "Irreducible Complexity" Perfectly All Right-While "Intelligent
Design" is Unconstitutional?
Furthermore, there is the possibility that the entire controversy is
nothing more than a dispute over mere words. In writing this piece, I was
surprised by the responses of several reviewers who suggested that the
teaching of a theory of irreducible complexity should not raise any
substantial Establishment Clause objection. One reader even offered the
possibility that irreducible complexity is a "straw man" in constitutional
292. Wikipedia, Pascal's Wager, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pascal's-Wager (last visited Sept.
28, 2008).
293. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
294. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 688-90 (2005) (recognizing this argument and citing
other cases that also recognize it).
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terms. In other words, the propriety of teaching irreducible complexity is so
clear that the legal question is trivial. Thus, the alleged offensiveness in the
theory lies in the words-"intelligent design"-and in what they imply. If
this view is correct, a teacher is on firm ground in covering the irreducible
complexity critique of natural selection with students in a public school
biology class. The teacher crosses the line, however, if the lesson develops
the inexorable conclusion that irreducible complexity suggests purposeful
design. But since irreducible complexity is a rebuttal to the random
mutation process that underlies natural selection, the truth is that the one
inevitably implies the other. Even if it is not a matter of syllogistic logic, the
implication should be the subject of questions from inquisitive students. A
mighty constitutional struggle, then, may come down to this: the teacher can
suggest irreducible complexity but cannot suggest what it necessarily means,
i.e., "purpose." One is tempted to think, "that can't be the law," but then
again, many of us have thought that before-about propositions that did
become the law, even though they depended upon mere wordplay.295
And perhaps the argument can be taken one step further. Perhaps the
word "design" is constitutionally permissible. In this view, it is the word
"intelligent" that provides the alleged offense. Design of one kind or
another is to be found in many observed aspects of nature. For example,
there is a "design" to the periodic table of elements, the table that is familiar
to students of chemistry.296 One can line up the elements by their atomic
numbers in repeating rows, and if the chart is systematic, metals will appear
on the left and noble gases on the right. One observes, over and again, that
the columns and rows are surprisingly regular. When one reaches chlorine,
for example, one finds it right below fluorine in the periodic table. Indeed,
the two share many predictable characteristics, most notably the ready
creation of ions with valence of negative one (-1). Furthermore, to the
extent that these two related elements are different, the differences are also
part of the "periodicity" (which is to say, the "design") of the table. For
example, the smaller atom, fluorine, is more active than chlorine. The
295. Compare, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (holding that the State cannot put
the burden of proving "sudden passion" on defendant to reduce murder to manslaughter because the
State had defined absence of passion as an element of the crime), with Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977) (holding that the State can put the burden on the defendant if the State merely re-
labels this factor as a defense).
296. See generally JOHN S. PHILLIPS ET AL., CHEMISTRY: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATION 92-93,
95-99, 102-07 (2002) (containing the periodic table and explaining the relationships between its
classifications and the characteristics of elements).
pattern made by the table itself, its very periodicity, forms a visual chart,
which conforms to an easily perceptible "design."
If a chemistry teacher were to refer to the "design" of the periodic table,
it seems doubtful that the Establishment Clause constabulary would insist
that the label is unconstitutional. Perhaps the same conclusion should apply
if a biology teacher were to describe the "design" of the bacterial flagellum
and offer irreducible complexity as a critique of natural selection. In fact,
the very phrasing of "intelligent" design can be viewed as tautologous
because "design" is inherently opposed to randomness and purposelessness,
and it conveys the same sense of an underlying pattern. This reasoning may
possibly mean that the Constitution poses no obstacle to a teacher telling
students that irreducible complexity suggests "design," even if not
"intelligent" design, even if the two are the same thing.
In fact, Wendell Bird, who has long championed creation science and
intelligent design, has said as much. He has acknowledged that he used the
creation-science label warily during the Edwards litigation only "because it
was the language of the time," and today, he says he is "not fully
comfortable with the [intelligent design] language, and would opt for
something more secular., 297 Professor Leslie Griffin concludes from this
observation that "[s]ecular language is more likely to fulfill a secular
purpose."'2 98 One hopes that this Republic has judges somewhere who can
avoid adjudication by mere labels, and who can avoid invalidating the
secular contributions or criticisms offered by religiously motivated people.
But then again, maybe not.
VI. CONCLUSION
My own conviction, then, is that intelligent design is an improbable
explanation for the development of any aspect of the natural world,
including the bacterial flagellum. After considering what biologists have to
say about the issue, I personally believe that the flagellum developed
through natural selection by the mechanism known as "exadaptation,"
meaning random mutations that led to a change in function of an existing
organ. I think the most likely pathway is that its origins were in an excretory
or secretory function, which could simultaneously and coincidentally have
furnished a means of locomotion.299 I would conjecture that while ridding
itself of undesirable byproducts, the microorganism probably also
incidentally expelled fluids that became propellants, and thus, as a
297. Leslie Griffin, The Story of Edwards v. Aguillard: The Genesis of Creation-Science, in
EDUCATION LAW STORIES 303-318 (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds., 2007).
298. Id. at 313.
299. This is the pathway suggested by Ian Musgrave. See supra notes 7, 29 and accompanying
text.
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consequence of the law of conservation of momentum, it found itself
traveling in the opposite direction. It is not too much to suppose, then, that
adaptation through a long series of mutations made for better locomotion by
producing a means of controlling the resulting motion more precisely, such
as the appearance of a cilium, or micro-hair, that enabled the bacterium to
better steer toward nutrition or away from an inhospitable environment.
And after that, the bearings, gears, universal joint, and corkscrew propeller
may have emerged, also by accident, over billions of generations. I admit to
having difficulty in surmising how the motor might have come about-the
gradient of positive hydrogen ions that drives the gear that meshes with the
flagellum shaft-but if the rest of these mechanisms could have developed
through natural selection, I suppose the gradient motor could have too. In
other words, the complexity of the flagellum may not be "irreducible." It
may be subject to a persuasive theory that proposes a series of small, non-
purposive steps, and someday, it may even be possible to test this
hypothesis.
But I would not have wanted to come to these conclusions without
considering the theories of irreducible complexity and intelligent design,
which I believe are thoughtful and scientific. Even less would I want to find
myself in a regime in which government presented natural selection as
though irreducible complexity were a taboo subject. In other words, the
censorship of irreducible complexity is not warranted by the Constitution or
policy. The theory of natural selection would be better understood, the
encouragement of new avenues of inquiry would remain more open, and the
question--"What is science?"-would be more effectively taught if the
theory of irreducible complexity were introduced as a criticism or alternative
to the theory of evolution. The accommodation of this idea could readily be
accomplished without overt religious content, which should not be suggested
in the teaching of evolution either. Further, it could be accomplished with
no more entanglement, religious effects, endorsement, coercion, or
proselytization than accompanies the anti-teleological indoctrination that
usually accompanies the teaching of natural selection.
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